Tilanne kuumenee Ukrainassa (Katso ohjeet alusta!)

[Miniluv]

Niin tuo teksti josta kuva on, on minun kirjoittamani epätäydellinen kooste Mercourisin YouTube-lähetyksistä.  Jokainen voi itse tarkistaa alkuperäisestä, minua ei tarvitse uskoa.

[ikuturso]

Niin tuo teksti josta kuva on, on minun kirjoittamani epätäydellinen kooste Mercourisin YouTube-lähetyksistä.  Jokainen voi itse tarkistaa alkuperäisestä, minua ei tarvitse uskoa.

Aaa. Hassua ettet

laittanut lainauksiin

vaan otit kuvan. En ymmärtänyt transkriptilyhennelmäksi videosta.

Katsoin Mercourisin kanavaa. Vaikuttaa puolueettomalta politiikan tarkkailijalta. Viimeisten videoiden otsikot:
-Rus missiles destroy Ukr power stations...
-Huge Rus missile strike, Rus advance...
-Rus calls West bluff, Threatens strikes
-West panic...
-Panic Zelensky...
-Panic deepens...

Ehkä olen lukenut vääriä uutislähteitä.

-i-

[Golimar]

En ostaisi käytettyä autoa tuolta jäbältä.

Mr Alexander Stamatis Mercouris

Barrister Status:
Disbarred
Called:
Nov 2006

Offence details:
Alexander Mercouris engaged in conduct likely to diminish public confidence in the legal profession or the administration of justice or otherwise bring the legal profession into disrepute, contrary to paragraph 301(a)(iii) in that on 28 October 2009 you purported to obtain a statement from H that was not a true document and you knew was not a true document and you had not had any contact with H.

Alexander Mercouris engaged in conduct likely to diminish public confidence in the legal profession or the administration of justice or otherwise bring the legal profession into disrepute, contrary to paragraph 301(a)(iii) in that you instructed J not to attend an appeal hearing in relation to a purported dispute with Westminster City Council on the basis that you were negotiating with Westminster City Council when no such negotiation was being conducted and you knew that no negotiation was being conducted.

Alexander Mercouris engaged in conduct likely to diminish public confidence in the legal profession or the administration of justice or otherwise bring the legal profession into disrepute, contrary to paragraph 301(a)(iii) in that you stated that you would be making an application to the Court for an interim payment of ?50,000 when you knew that no such application had been made or was going to be made.

Alexander Mercouris engaged in conduct likely to diminish public confidence in the legal profession or the administration of justice or otherwise bring the legal profession into disrepute, contrary to paragraph 301(a)(iii) in that you claimed that ?983,000, a settlement by Westminster City Council in favour of J, had been stolen by your brother.

Alexander Mercouris engaged in conduct likely to diminish public confidence in the legal profession or the administration of justice or otherwise bring the legal profession into disrepute, contrary to section 301(a)(iii) in that you purported in a statement dated 11 December 2009 that you had been detained by bogus police officers and taken to a meeting at the Royal Courts of Justice where P a senior law lord tried to bribe you to drop a legal case in return for a payment to you of ?50,000 plus payment of your debts and mortgage knowing that this did not happen and dishonestly claiming that it did.

Sanction:
Disbarred
Costs:
£¤786.00

https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/disciplinary_finding/76984.html

[Miniluv]

Katsoin Mercourisin kanavaa. Vaikuttaa puolueettomalta politiikan tarkkailijalta.

Voihan sitä pysyä täälläkin, missä Venäjä hajoaa ihan kohtsiltään ja kedot kasvavat sadoillatuhansilla ryssillä lannoitettuja auringonkukkia     Nyt vaikutti siltä, että jotain isompaa, ehkä väliaikaista, mutta kuitenkin on tapahtunut. Ja välttämättä mediasta ei ole helppo hahmottaa tätä, esimerkkinä syvähaudattu Iltalehden* uutisen maininta Ranskan edustajasta Putlerin virkaanastujaisissa.

===

In the wide-ranging interview, Mr Cummings also revealed he has not spoken to Mr Johnson since he walked out of No 10 in November 2020.

He claimed the Tory party has not taken advantage of Brexit opportunities since Britain left the European Union.

Mr Cummings also took aim at the Government's support for Ukraine, describing the country as a "corrupt mafia state" and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine's president, as a "pumpkin".

"We should have never got into the whole stupid situation," he said. "This is not a replay of 1940 with the pumpkin Zelensky as the Churchillian underdog.

"This whole Ukrainian corrupt mafia state has basically conned us all and we're all going to get f-----d as a consequence. We are getting f-----d now, right?"

Mr Cummings said the West's support for Ukraine had pushed Russia closer to China and taught Vladimir Putin "that we're a bunch of total f-----g jokers".

"I mean Putin already knew that before the war," he said. "But this has emphasised it and broadcast it to the entire world."

Boris Johnsonin ex neuvonantaja ja suuret suunnitelmat.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2024/05/09/dominic-cummings-unveils-plans-for-new-party-replace-tories/

[Lasse]

Alexander Mercourisin viime päivien lähetyksistä (liitekuva). Lännen puheet joukkojen laittamisesta Ukrainaan loppuivat, kun Venäjä
ilmoitti, että sillä pääsee sotaan osalliseksi eikä vastaus rajoitu Ukrainan alueelle. Harjoitus taktisilla ydinaseilla liittyi myös asiaan. Stoltenberg rakentaa nyt no boots on the ground -julistusta.

Tähän peruutusliikkeeseen liittyvät myös lausunnot, joiden mukaan Kerchin sillta ei ole enää sotilaskäytössä.

Pitää ymmärtää, ettei esim. Mercouris ole mikään auktoriteetti, johon vedoten yritetään, no, väittää jotain tapahtuneeksi, vaan hän on vain yksi julkinen analyytikko, joka itsekin yrittää muodostaa tilannekuvaa, joka pitää paikkansa, tai sitten ei.

(Myös) Omasta mielestäni Alexander on yleensä hyvin perillä ns. isosta kuvasta, ja jos asiassa on epävarmuutta, se tavallisesti lausutaan ääneen.

Suursotatilanteen nykyiset käänteet aiheuttanevat all-in hooholeitten puolesta elävien ja tuntevien falangissa keskisuurta kovempaa peppukipua, johon Scheriproctkaan ei enää auta, niin saamme sellaisia epämukavuuden ilmaisuja, joita saamme tänään(kin) täällä todistaa.

---------------

Jäsen Miniluvin muistilista korreloi hyvin pitkälle BlackMountainAnalysis (BMA:n) viimeisimmän kanssa, joitain eroja tietty esiintyy:

https://bmanalysis.substack.com/p/update-on-ukraine-i

Strategic Picture
I have almost nothing to add to the situation in Ukraine since my latest strategic update, except a few little thoughts that I will discuss below. But first, if you have not already read my latest strategic update on Ukraine, see the article here.

Kerch Bridge
Since the American funds for Ukraine have finally been released, we can expect many surprises in the next months. It was never seriously in doubt that the funds would eventually be released, but it was interesting to learn under what scheme they would push it through. The result was somehow... unspectacular. I expected something more dramatic. But here we are.

Speaker Johnson did a calculation of what would benefit him the most. He waited strategically to leverage the most concessions to him (backdoor concessions...), and when it was most favorable to him, he simply gave in. In the short term, he will now take some hits, but considering the long-term benefits (after a period when the media attention dies down), I'm sure he made a good deal for himself. Maybe he will get a well-paid job somewhere in several years? Or he will be a future presidential candidate? (In many years). Who knows. And it doesn't matter.

What matters is that he, as an elected representative, should not be looking out for his own benefit but for what is best for America. And considering this, he should have "gone down fighting." The funds will still be released. No questions about that. But it is about integrity...and saving lives. Remember? The funds (at least the few billion that are assigned to Ukraine) will be used to make sure that the Ukrainian male population dies and the rest of the young Ukrainians will be absorbed (stolen) by the Europeans.

So, nothing unusual or unexpected. Business as usual in politics.

What does this have to do with the Kerch Bridge? A lot. Even though the biggest part of the funds dedicated to Ukraine will be used to pay salaries, bribes, and villas abroad and for fleeing Ukrainian politicians after the collapse, there are still a few surprises.

I assume that the daily consumption of weapons and equipment by the Ukrainian army is not linked to any aid package from anyone. Otherwise, Ukraine would have collapsed long ago. So, the logistics supply chain is running autonomously, mainly sourced by the Americans but also from some European countries that can afford it. The guys from The Duran had a good point, obviously, by suggesting that a fair share of the $61bn would be used to close positions from already delivered weapons in their inventories.

We are talking about:

Small arms
Ammunition
Tanks and IFVs
Uniforms
Medical Equipment
Logistics Equipment
ATGMs
Air Defense equipment
Drones
Explosives
And far more

Since the Ukrainians have a very short life span from the moment they are mobilized, one needs to continuously deliver equipment, weapons, and ammunition to all the people kidnapped from the streets and thrown into the battle by force. Most of these weapons won't be used since these people usually die before they see a Russian soldier.

We are talking about basic equipment for infantry or motorized brigades.

Still, there are some strategically relevant US weapons and equipment, like some types of ATACMS missiles, that the US can't ship without the knowledge of the American public (or their representatives, who really don't care about control).

The point is that Ukraine is collapsing now at a considerable pace. There is not much time left to do any critical damage to the Russians before Ukraine goes to Russia. Except for a few things...

Damaging Russia's military and civilian infrastructure is now a high priority for the West, while possible. For the same reason, the West wants to kill able-bodied Ukrainians and steal the rest of the surviving young Ukrainians (making them refugees after the collapse of Ukraine).

Maybe the Europeans should stop listening to the Woke bullshit they are being fed, which implies that family and kids are undesirable, and instead, they should buy several bottles of wine, lock the bedroom door, and... solve the demographics problems 😊 Instead of forcefully incorporating poor young people from warzones where the West initiated the war...

However, these attacks against Russian infrastructure have little to no impact on the war. That's known to everyone. Listen to the leaked tapes of the Bundeswehr discussing the value of damaging the Kerch Bridge... But it definitely has an impact on Russian resources. That is an economic perspective that needs to be taken into consideration during, and especially after, the war:

How many resources will Russia be forced to divert (during the war) from the military in order to mitigate the impact on its infrastructure?

And after the war?

How many resources will Russia be forced to expend to rebuild the parts of Ukraine that will become part of Russia then?

How many resources will be needed to solve the epic demographic situation after the male population dies or flees, and the youth perhaps disappear into the West and into Russia?

How many resources will be needed to mitigate the impact of the strikes against Russian infrastructure so that there is no impact on civilians? (eliminating protest potential).

And the most important question of all:

What could Russia have done with all those resources in a macroeconomic sense instead of simply repairing a capital stock that already existed?

And what will Russia's competitors (yes, meaning other BRICS states) be doing at the same time with their resources in the new trade system instead of simply repairing broken stuff?

Even though it will keep the Russian economy very busy for decades and the Russians will be doing well with their domestically focused economy, they will suffer on the international markets compared to their competitors. In fact, their main export goods will remain their natural resources instead of finished goods, at least for the next few decades.

Keep this in mind. It is important. It is not really a significant problem for Russia because Russia is used to it. However, it is an advantage for their competitors in the West (and the East) in terms of securing foreign markets with their own goods made from Russian resources.

However, let's get to the point: The Kerch Bridge. Is it used for military logistics or not? Is it a military target or not? Can it be destroyed? Will it be destroyed? What are the implications? Let's discuss these things.

Is the Kerch Bridge used for military logistics?

I don't have specific knowledge, but I would argue that some percentage of the military shipments to Crimea use this route. Logistics is a complicated subject, especially during wartime. From my point of view, it would be irresponsible not to use this route as long as it is available for all shipments, including military goods.

Remember the discussion about whether Russia receives weapons and ammunition from North Korea, Iran, and China? I have written from the beginning of this blog that it is a certainty that Russia DOES receive supplies from its allies. Even though others argued that Russia is the sole ultra power of this planet and can handle everything on its own, no, it can't. This is war, and you must use every available leverage over your enemy; otherwise, it translates into defeat or high casualties.

The same goes with the Kerch Bridge. Even though I don't know, I'm sure that it still is being used for some military goods.

Here is the next point: Russia has a serious naval logistics problem. Even before the war, it was critical, for example, for supplying its Syrian bases by sea. It took Russia several years until it was able to supply Tartus and Khmeimim with its own military capabilities. For some time, it relied on chartered Russian and even Turkish civilian cargo ships. The problem was solved eventually.

Everyone is focusing on how many tanks, submarines, or frigates Russia produces. No one ever asked about how many auxiliary and logistics assets/equipment Russia produces to maintain the operability of these weapons.

To be clear, I believe Russia is meeting its goals for supply. But we need to keep in mind that Russia's capabilities for doing that are determined by the available logistics infrastructure.

Why do I write this? Because the means to supply a peninsula with five million citizens and a large military garrison is incredibly difficult. Especially during wartime. There are means to do it. From 2014, prior to the opening of the Kerch Bridge, it was accomplished by air and ferries. But now we have war. Almost all logistics assets, including naval assets, are bottlenecks.

All the Ukrainian, seemingly senseless, attacks against "old" Russian landing ships, etc., always had a purpose. Many argued that an old Russian ship that was due for scrapping was sunk when such an event took place. But that is not accurate. These are not battleships but can be considered armored cargo ships. Their purpose is to transport goods from A to B. Even very old ships can fill this purpose.

I was the Head of Logistics for an international company for some time, that's why I always keep my focus on logistics and not on propaganda. Russia is short of naval supply vessels. It was unnecessary in the past since there was no need for power projection. Operations like in Syria wouldn't have been needed at all had there been no plans by the West to subjugate the world... But here we are.

The best example of this is the rescue ship Kommuna of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. It was built 1912 and it is still in service since it meets its purpose. Why scrap or replace it, then? It is the Western mentality to replace a car after the first scratch appears. Ignoring that the car is still fulfilling its purpose (I'm exaggerating). However, this ship also was attacked. A ship from 1912. Of course, it was attacked; I would do the same. It has an important purpose, and if it were sunk, the Russians would need to invest funds and devote resources of a shipyard to replace this lost capability to do XYZ.

I'm coming slowly but steadily to a conclusion: What "Ukraine" is doing in the Black Sea, be it against the Black Sea Fleet or against Crimea has nothing to do with Ukraine's "interests" or the war in Ukraine. These are solely NATO operations to cripple Russia's Black Sea Fleet capabilities.

So, yes, Russia should and most likely IS still supplying Crimea by the Kerch Bridge. Still, I would argue that it is for the purpose of risk management. It is to be expected that logistics over this bridge will be interrupted, so it would be madness to rely heavily on this bridge. I would argue (from experience) that we should expect a level of sourcing of 20% by the Kerch Bridge.

Is it a military target?

So, is the Kerch Bridge a military target? Yes, and an important one indeed. I'll explain later in more depth, but for starters, think about the cargo volume (civilian and military) and civilians traveling between Krasnodar and Crimea daily/weekly/monthly. Roughly five million people need to be supplied. Disrupting this logistics artery for an extended period during wartime and during the holiday season would be disastrous. Everyone focuses on the question of whether it would influence the war or its outcome. Fine, but what about the people living in Crimea?

Don't get me wrong here. I'm sure that contingencies have been in place since the beginning of the war, for example, through the Donetsk and Kherson regions and by ferries (which are scarce). However, these routes are vulnerable since they are going through a war zone. You can't transport civilians by these routes due to the danger of attack.

What is my point? Simple: If this route breaks it would put an enormous strain on military logistics to keep Crimea supplied. In other words, Routes like the new railway route by land would need to handle both military logistics and civilian logistics simultaneously. Impossible? No, of course not. But there is a nice (rather not?) English word that I learned during a project in Birmingham, England, to describe the situation: Pain in the ass.

As everyone argues, it surely will not change the outcome of the war. But it is, in fact, the only means for the West to cause real and palpable pain to Russian logistics. There are no other means to achieve a similar effect.

Can it be destroyed?

During this war, we have learned a lot about the destructive capabilities of missiles, particularly regarding the destruction of infrastructure and the capabilities of air defenses. Not only in Ukraine but in the Middle East as well. To be fair, the theoretical capabilities of both Russian and Western air defense assets did not match the actual results seen on the battlefield. And that makes sense. In ideal environments, you always achieve better results than on the battlefield especially if your opponents are working together to find and exploit your weaknesses.

So, yes, if the West wants it, then hits on the Kerch Bridge will be accomplished.

Can it be destroyed? No, it cannot. The weapons available to Ukraine can't destroy the pillars. If multiple ATACMS missiles hit one pillar at the same time, they could. But this scenario is almost impossible, given the air defense efforts around the bridge and the limited accuracy of the missiles.

It is almost certain that, in the case of a mass attack, one or more of the road spans and/or railway tracks would be damaged or destroyed. This could cause an interruption of several weeks or months, depending on how many spans and/or tracks were destroyed.

What is meant by the West when it says, "Destroy the bridge." Make it entirely sink? That would be very difficult even without air defense, and you would need to plant tons of explosives on many pillars to make the structure itself collapse. With these missiles—impossible.

So, when the West talks about destroying the Kerch Bridge, it essentially means disrupting logistics for a certain period.

Will it be destroyed?

There is a finite probability that logistics over the Kerch Bridge will be interrupted for a period of time. Is it certain to happen? I don't know. However, it would not change the outcome or the direction of the war. It would only be, as explained before, a "Pain in the ass". 😊

What are the implications?

Why is southern logistics so important for Russia? Why are these ATACMS missiles coming now and not earlier? The Southern front is calm. Is the southern military supply route important at all?

For now, it is less important than other areas of the war zone. The fact that the West is escalating efforts to destroy it now tells me one thing: Intelligence is in place that Ukrainian front lines and defenses on the east side of the Dnieper are going to collapse within the next few months, and Ukraine might be forced to withdraw across the Dnieper. At this point, southern logistics might become important again, depending on the ability of the Ukrainians to resist across the Dnieper in Zaporizhia and Kherson at the same time when Russia is rolling up the front lines in the north.

Honestly, I don't know. But, seeing emphasis put on the southern logistics route by the West, I'd say this is directly connected to a potential advance on Odessa.

Don't get me wrong. I don't expect at ANY time that Russia will be approaching Odessa fighting. The Ukrainian Army will be gone BEFORE Russia reaches Odessa. Except for one possible event: If some chickens (Westerners) appear in Odessa. This might have catastrophic consequences, but I already wrote about that.

F16s
There is also talk about the imminent appearance of F16s in Ukraine. Since the Soviet planes that were available have already been supplied and almost all have been shot down, there has been a need to bolster the fleet with new aircraft. The F16 makes a lot of sense because it is available in large numbers and it can carry the most important missiles. Trained pilots are also plentiful.

It is not about survivability in a dogfight. It is simply to keep a platform in the air that can periodically strike targets behind Russia's lines to cause some pain. Not to change anything but to cause some pain by attacking those targets that are not well-defended. It also boosts Ukrainian morale by maintaining the perception that they still have an active Air Force and are hitting Russian targets.

I think the question is not whether they will operate from Ukrainian soil or from NATO soil. Or whether NATO pilots will fly them or Ukrainians. It simply doesn't matter as long these planes are operating in Ukraine and don't attack the Black Sea Fleet or old Russian territory. The vectors of approach are also relevant. Will they approach directly from Romania, flying over the Black Sea? I don't think this would be tolerated.

And what about the pilots? There is always the discussion about what planes Ukrainian pilots can fly and whether they can learn to fly NATO planes since they are used to flying only Soviet designs. Okay? Which Ukrainian pilots? Almost all of them turned already into ghosts of Kiev.

There is credible information that the Ukrainians sent a few guys with no motivation and education to the West to learn to fly F16s. The West is not even confident whether these guys will ever be capable of flying an F16. And if so, only after another year.

Who will fly these planes then, IF they appear? Of course: NATO mercenaries! Also, there is an almost unlimited supply of these planes. I think the babbling about the Dutch F16s, etc., is only a distraction. Yes, maybe they will be delivered, or maybe not. But there are more than enough available to make them vanish without account.

So, yes. They will possibly appear and continue what the Soviet planes did before. Maybe, slightly more effectively since they will be Western pilots with Western planes and Western missiles. So, maybe one or another missile will get through and destroy XYZ. And then, after using it for practice to calibrate Russian air defense algorithms, they will become targets for the turkey shoot again.

There is another aspect. Russia could soon start to advance deeply in the Dnieper direction and beyond. These troops will become more vulnerable to air-to-surface missiles since they will be mainly protected by short-range air means, which will not be calibrated to the new threat at first. Note: No one will use S-400 missiles to shoot down air-launched missiles against troops... Yes, that is a little sad but it is reality. Still, the missile carrier (the plane) definitely could receive a welcome gift from an S-400 battery.

Dnieper Bridges
Since the beginning, there has always been the question of why the Dnieper bridges are still standing. I answered that question very early on. You can read it from the beginning of BMA. It was always in Russia's favor to fight the Ukrainian army on the East Side of the Dnieper instead of on the West Side. Why?

Friendly population
Short Supply Lines
Bordering with (old) Russia
Establishes Supply Lines
Strategic and Operational long-range air defense
Less need for Logistics Equipment
The absolute opposite applies to the Ukrainians.

Recently, rumors have circulated "explaining" why Russia hasn't destroyed the bridges:

Asset for negotiations
I don't think so.
Red lines by the West
I don't think so.
No means to destroy it

It is a challenge to destroy the major bridges over the Dnieper, especially from a distance. If one hits only the spans, they can certainly be restored repeatedly, for military purposes. We saw that with the Antonivskyi bridge in Kherson. It was penetrated daily like Swiss cheese, and after a day or two, it was operational again for Russian military transport.

So, to destroy a bridge in a way that you can't restore it quickly, the pillars need to be destroyed, and therefore, you need a missile/rocket with a lot of explosive energy or with a lot of kinetic energy to penetrate the pillars.

Of course, this does not apply to every kind of bridge architecture, but a lot of the Dnieper Bridges were constructed in the Soviet way with military and civil dual-purpose considerations.

So, yes – it is a challenge to destroy the Dnieper bridges. But it is possible. Especially since we can assume that the production of Kinzhals has been ramped up. I think they would be the best way to penetrate the Bridge Pillars effectively.

Still, these are scarce resources, and Russia will use them only on these Bridges after a strategic decision by the top leadership.

Waiting for the right moment to destroy them

I would argue that it would make sense to preserve these Bridges for after the war, since this will be Russia. And for Russian Army logistics for operations on the West side of the Dnieper IF needed. All of this will then be Russia, and these bridges will need to be restored, which is resource-intensive.

Nevertheless, I think that these bridges will be destroyed by the Ukrainians themselves anyway when they withdraw to the West side of the Dnieper, so this consideration doesn't make sense at all.

Hence, there is still the possibility that Russia will delay the destruction until most of the Ukrainian army troops and equipment are on the east side. In other words, when the number of reinforcements is dwindling. Then Russia can isolate the whole grouping of Ukrainian forces on the east side from safety on the west side without the possibility of reinforcement or withdrawal.

This might occur within the next few weeks or months.

Will it happen? I don't know; I'm still a little skeptical. We will see.

However, destroying the Dnieper bridges could be just one escalation step of many by the Russians. Some are tactical and will be done in response to escalation by Ukraine (the West). However, it is not very wise to escalate against Russia from a Ukrainian perspective. Since the West controls the playbook for Ukraine, their decisions are not to be measured by whether they are in Ukraine's interest but whether they are in the West's interest. And, again, everything that damages Russia or Ukraine (will be Russia again) is good. So, the West will continue the escalation.

Chasov Yar and Ocheretino
Russia has been targeting and slowly grinding down the best-defended Ukrainian frontline cities from the start of the SMO, instead of bypassing them through less defendable territories. This was the sole reason for forcing the Ukrainians to commit their best troops in such "meatgrinders" to attract them in the fastest possible way. The main stronghold for the Ukrainians in the Donbass region is currently Chasov Yar. If it falls, Russia has access to Kramatorsk and Slavyansk, which would be the last stand for Ukraine in the Donetsk region.

Ukraine is forced to commit everything possible to hold Chasov Yar, which is favorable to Russia. The remaining Ukrainian forces can be destroyed in one place. Russia plans its logistics around such meatgrinders to enable the best possible means of destroying everything inside such meatgrinder.

What does that mean?

Russian Air Defense and Electronic Warfare means are in place to protect the forward units from everything that flies on the frontlines. We can assume that Ukraine is concentrating some elite forces for battle in these places. So, everything should be done to protect Russia's forward units against these possible threats.

Russia is concentrating its own air force assets (FABs?) and drone forces at such meatgrinders.

Russia is concentrating its artillery forces at such places.

Russia is also concentrating its reconnaissance means in such places.

In other words, Everything that is needed to protect its own forward troops and to inflict maximum damage on the enemy troops within the meat grinder to make it as effective as possible. Effectiveness is, of course, measured by the number of degraded enemy forces per period of time.

Now, is Chasov Yar a meatgrinder? I'd like to discuss this a little deeper.

(jatkuu artikkelissa, kannattaa lukea kokonaan)

Jos ajattelee Aleksin linjoilla, että koko Ukraina-RUS -sokoran päämotivaatio oli horjuttaa Venäjää, ja jos Ukraina on lähellä romahtamista, niin nyt tulee kiire yrittää vielä iskeä heikentäviä iskuja, jotta Venäjän tulevaa ekonomista toimintaa sodan jälkeen voidaan maksimaalisesti puukottaa nyt, kun lähes kaikki keinot ovat vielä käytössä...

[ikuturso]

ˆˆ Boris Johnsonin neuvonantaja Cummingsilla oli mielenkiintoinen rooli Spitting Imagessa.
Lapsia syövä avaruusolento.

Jos Brexitin jälkeen joku puhuu "totuuksia" UK:ssa, siellä monen suussa on enemmän katkeruus kuin totuus.

Spitting Image, Boris Johnson erottaa Cummingsin

-i-

MUOKS: Ja jotain suurta lienee tapahtumassa. Ydinaseretoriikka nostaa zyssänmaalla päätään. Minä olen vähän niitä taktisia jo odotellutkin nurkkaan ajetun karhun kuolinkorahduksista,

[Konnetaabeli]

ryzzzä ei saa aikaan mitään suurempaa, kunhan marssittaa mobikkeja joka päivä kuolemaan tuhatkunta kapppaletta. ryzzzäähän se ei haittaa, koska miehiä tuleee v*tusta ja rahaa voi painaa lisää kun loppuu. Mutta ei se ryzzzä sillä mitään saa aikaan.

Mitä ryzzzän rakastamaan ydinaseilla heristelyyn tulee, niin sitähän se on tehnyt jo kaksi vuotta vähän väliä, kun ei muuhun pysty. Vähän niin kuin sammumispisteessä pubissa örisevä sika, joka julistaa viimeisimmällä puhekyvyllään ennen sammumistaan, että sillä on isoimmat munat, usotko?

[Lasse]

Faskinoiva historiikki, jossa peilataan aina Itävalta-Unkarin Keisarikuntaan:

Ukrainian Losses And The Role An Austrian Archduke Has Had In Them
https://www.moonofalabama.org/2024/05/ukrainian-losses-and-the-role-an-austrian-archduke-has-had-in-them.html#more

A recent piece in the New York Times connects us to a name which played a serious role in the last century of Ukrainian 'nationalism'.

The history of the western Ukrainian region is, like in some other European areas, a quite convoluted drama that still plays out today.

The first reports of war fatigue in the 'nationalist' western Ukraine are coming in. Natalia Yermak, a Ukrainian cartoon producer turned New York Times journalist, reports from the Galician area near Lviv:

In Western Ukraine, a Community Wrestles With Patriotism or Survival (archived) - New York Times
As the war drags on, communities that were steadfast in their commitment to the war effort have been shaken by the unending violence on the front line.

It was sunset when Maj. Kyrylo Vyshyvany of the Ukrainian army stepped into the yard of his childhood home in Duliby, a village in western Ukraine, just after his younger brother, also a soldier, had been buried. Their mother was still crying in the living room.
"I can already see that she'll be coming to visit him every day," he said that day. He was right, but he would not be by her side. A few days after the funeral, in March 2022, he was killed in a Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian military base and buried next to his brother, Vasyl.

The Vyshyvany brothers were the first deaths from Duliby and the surrounding community after Russia began its full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022. Since then, 44 more Ukrainian soldiers from the area have been killed — more than four times the local death toll from the previous eight years of fighting Russian-backed separatists in the east.

For Duliby and its surrounding enclave of Khodoriv — total population around 24,000 people — waiting for the next solemn death notification and the funeral that follows has become a bitter routine. But even as the town meets and buries the fallen with modest ceremony, some neighbors are quietly weighing the price they are willing to pay for a war with no end in sight.

Divisions have started to form between residents agnostic about the war — often those whose family members have dodged the draft or fled the country — and those who have loved ones on the front line or who fully support the war effort.

The name Vyshyvany looked quite familiar to me. I'll come back to it.

(jatkuu artikkelissa, ml. Vyshyvanyn kiehtova historia)

Olen joskus junnuna lukenut kunnon sotamies Svejkin seikkailuista maailmansodassa, mutten muista paljonkaan. Huomasin juuri, että Eero Balkilta ilmestyi uusi käännös 1991, suoraan alkukielestä. Täytynee etsiä käsiini...

[Konnetaabeli]

Mahorkka käryää taas ryzzzänmaalla, tai sitten öljynjalostamo (monesko lie)?

Drones hit oil refinery in Russia's Kaluga Oblast – video

Drones attacked the Pervyy Zavod (First Plant) oil refinery in Russia's Kaluga Oblast on the night of 9-10 May.

Source: Russian media with reference to local residents; Astra Telegram channel; The Moscow Times

Details: Several powerful explosions have been heard in the Dzerzhinsky district in Kaluga Oblast.

Local residents reported they heard the distinctive sounds of several UAVs flying overhead, after which a fire broke out in the area near the oil refinery.

UkrPravda

Several drones attack oil depot in Russia's Krasnodar Krai

Several drones attacked an oil depot in Yurovka, Russia's Krasnodar Krai, on the night of May 8 to 9.
The BBC Russian Service announced this on Telegram, Ukrinform reports.

"About six drones were suppressed, but several fell on the territory of the oil depot. As a result, a fire broke out -- several tanks were damaged," the post said.

UkrInform

[Konnetaabeli]

Faskinoiva historiikki, jossa peilataan aina Itävalta-Unkarin Keisarikuntaan:

Ukrainian Losses And The Role An Austrian Archduke Has Had In Them
https://www.moonofalabama.org/2024/05/ukrainian-losses-and-the-role-an-austrian-archduke-has-had-in-them.html#more

A recent piece in the New York Times connects us to a name which played a serious role in the last century of Ukrainian 'nationalism'.

The history of the western Ukrainian region is, like in some other European areas, a quite convoluted drama that still plays out today.

The first reports of war fatigue in the 'nationalist' western Ukraine are coming in. Natalia Yermak, a Ukrainian cartoon producer turned New York Times journalist, reports from the Galician area near Lviv:

In Western Ukraine, a Community Wrestles With Patriotism or Survival (archived) - New York Times
As the war drags on, communities that were steadfast in their commitment to the war effort have been shaken by the unending violence on the front line.

It was sunset when Maj. Kyrylo Vyshyvany of the Ukrainian army stepped into the yard of his childhood home in Duliby, a village in western Ukraine, just after his younger brother, also a soldier, had been buried. Their mother was still crying in the living room.
"I can already see that she'll be coming to visit him every day," he said that day. He was right, but he would not be by her side. A few days after the funeral, in March 2022, he was killed in a Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian military base and buried next to his brother, Vasyl.

The Vyshyvany brothers were the first deaths from Duliby and the surrounding community after Russia began its full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022. Since then, 44 more Ukrainian soldiers from the area have been killed — more than four times the local death toll from the previous eight years of fighting Russian-backed separatists in the east.

For Duliby and its surrounding enclave of Khodoriv — total population around 24,000 people — waiting for the next solemn death notification and the funeral that follows has become a bitter routine. But even as the town meets and buries the fallen with modest ceremony, some neighbors are quietly weighing the price they are willing to pay for a war with no end in sight.

Divisions have started to form between residents agnostic about the war — often those whose family members have dodged the draft or fled the country — and those who have loved ones on the front line or who fully support the war effort.

The name Vyshyvany looked quite familiar to me. I'll come back to it.

(jatkuu artikkelissa, ml. Vyshyvanyn kiehtova historia)

Olen joskus junnuna lukenut kunnon sotamies Svejkin seikkailuista maailmansodassa, mutten muista paljonkaan. Huomasin juuri, että Eero Balkilta ilmestyi uusi käännös 1991, suoraan alkukielestä. Täytynee etsiä käsiini...

Sähän voisit cut&pastata tänne sen koko Svejkin tarinan, jättämättä siitäkin kertomatta lyhyesti mikä on stoorin opetus. Nyt olet todistanut, että osaat cut&paste-operaation, mutta opettelisitko poimimaan noista vuodatuksista sen ydinasian, minkä haluat vuodatuksella kertoa. (Vai maksetaanko teille rivimäärän mukaan?)

Mä taas tykkään kertoa lyhyesti, where is the beef:

1. ryzzzä on tänään alkaen klo 05:00 hyökkäämään Kharkiv:ssa, yhteensä n. 100 hyökkäystä .

2. Ukrainan armeija on lyönyt omilla joukoillaan ja tykistökeskityksin ryzzzän takaisin.

Russian Offensive Begins in Kharkiv Region; AFU Halts Advance With Artillery Fire, Says Zelensky

An unnamed senior Ukrainian military source revealed that Russian forces aim to push Ukrainian troops back up to 10 km to establish a buffer zone, but Kyiv's forces are resisting.

KyivPost

Russians launched an offensive in Kharkiv region, almost a hundred combat engagements on the frontline in a day - General Staff

Ukrainian troops repelled numerous Russian attacks in several areas, including Kharkiv region, inflicting losses on Russian troops and equipment as a result of air strikes and artillery shelling.

UNN

[Miniluv]

ryzzzä ei saa aikaan mitään suurempaa, kunhan marssittaa mobikkeja joka päivä kuolemaan tuhatkunta kapppaletta. ryzzzäähän se ei haittaa, koska miehiä tuleee v*tusta ja rahaa voi painaa lisää kun loppuu. Mutta ei se ryzzzä sillä mitään saa aikaan.

Venäjä sanoo tuoreen huipun tulleen ukr kuolleissa ja haavoittuneissa: 1 500 per päivä. Ukr väittämä keskiarvo on tuhannen tienoossa. En halua kenenkään ottavan noita totuutena, mutta esim. Zelensky sanoo kranaattien ammuntasuhdeluvun olevan 1:10 ukr tappioksi. Miettikää tätä itse päissänne, kotona perjantai-iltana.

Attrition war on oma taiteenlajinsa.  Sota ratkeaa omien yksiköiden säilyttämisellä ja tuotannolla, ei hienoilla manöövereillä, pikavoitoilla tai joka tuumasta kiinni pitämisellä.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine

Mitä ryzzzän rakastamaan ydinaseilla heristelyyn tulee, niin sitähän se on tehnyt jo kaksi vuotta vähän väliä, kun ei muuhun pysty. Vähän niin kuin sammumispisteessä pubissa örisevä sika, joka julistaa viimeisimmällä puhekyvyllään ennen sammumistaan, että sillä on isoimmat munat, usotko?

Nyt näytti tulevan ydinaseista muistuttamisesta tulosta ja euro-napoleoneilla meni tenat vaihtoon. Viittaan aiemmin tänään postaamani.

[Lasse]

Eversti Davis (evp) tarkkailee tilannetta:

BREAKING: Russia Northern Offensive Begins
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e8eghumdXAI

8,325 views  Streamed live 3 hours ago  #Ukraine #Russia #Putin

[KamalaJari]

Putte antautuu ihan just , ei tollaisia tappioita mikään armeija kestä , alkaa olla ekan maailman kahinan lukuja .
Mitä sitten tapahtuu ? Venäjä vetäytyy ja maksaa sotakorvauksia , putte tulee Haagiin tuomiolla ja sillee ?

[Keza]

ryzzzä ei saa aikaan mitään suurempaa, kunhan marssittaa mobikkeja joka päivä kuolemaan tuhatkunta kapppaletta. ryzzzäähän se ei haittaa, koska miehiä tuleee v*tusta ja rahaa voi painaa lisää kun loppuu. Mutta ei se ryzzzä sillä mitään saa aikaan.

Venäjä sanoo tuoreen huipun tulleen ukr kuolleissa ja haavoittuneissa: 1 500 per päivä. Ukr väittämä keskiarvo on tuhannen tienoossa. En halua kenenkään ottavan noita totuutena, mutta esim. Zelensky sanoo kranaattien ammuntasuhdeluvun olevan 1:10 ukr tappioksi. Miettikää tätä itse päissänne, kotona perjantai-iltana.

Attrition war on oma taiteenlajinsa.  Sota ratkeaa omien yksiköiden säilyttämisellä ja tuotannolla, ei hienoilla manöövereillä, pikavoitoilla tai joka tuumasta kiinni pitämisellä.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine

Mitä ryzzzän rakastamaan ydinaseilla heristelyyn tulee, niin sitähän se on tehnyt jo kaksi vuotta vähän väliä, kun ei muuhun pysty. Vähän niin kuin sammumispisteessä pubissa örisevä sika, joka julistaa viimeisimmällä puhekyvyllään ennen sammumistaan, että sillä on isoimmat munat, usotko?

Nyt näytti tulevan ydinaseista muistuttamisesta tulosta ja euro-napoleoneilla meni tenat vaihtoon. Viittaan aiemmin tänään postaamani.

Mielenkiintoinen artikkeli, tosin ei koko totuus. Kyllähän moni sota on ratkennut manöövereillä, kuten Lähi-Idän 1967 sota, ja miksei 1973 sota vaikkei Israelilla ole joukkoja vaikka Egyptin täydelliseen lyömiseen. Toinen suurikin ratkesi osaltaan liikuntasotana, vaikka perimmäinen ratkaisija oli tuotanto, resurssit ja väkimäärä. Todisti tietysti myöskin oikeaksi Fredrik II Suuren väittämän, että se joka puolustaa kaikkea ei puolusta mitään. Olen pitkään ajatellut, ettei Zelenski ole sisäistänyt tätä ja on pakottanut Ukrainan armeijan useamman kerran roikkumaan tietyissä kaupungeissa tuehan pitkään. Venäläiset ovat hyviä jauhamaan kohteita muuskaksi voimakkaalla tykistöllään.
Toisaalta von Falkenhayn Verdun suunnitelma (kuluttaa ranskalaiset suuressa kulutustaistelussa loppuun) kusi pahasti, tosin yhtenä merkittävänä syynä oli se, että Saksan 5. armeijaa siellä komensi kruununprinssi, joka isänsä tapaan halusi kunniaa ja maastovoittoja. Ja toisaalta ranskalaisten yllättävän sitkeä puolustus.

[Ari-Lee]

Russia at war! Day 51.

808 ​Days of russia-Ukraine War – russian Casualties In Ukraine
May 11, 2024

Personnel – 481,030 (+1,320),
Tanks – 7,449 (+15) units,
APV – 14,353 (+40) units,
Artillery systems – 12,442 (+55) units,
MLRS – 1,064 (+2) units,
Anti-aircraft warfare systems – 796 (+1) units,
Aircraft – 349 (+0) units,
Helicopters – 325 (+0) units,
UAV operational-tactical level – 9,868 (+42) units,
Cruise missiles – 2,193 (+1) units,
Boats / warships – 26 (+0) units,
Submarines – 1 (+0)
Special equipment – 2,040 (+9) units,
Vehicles and fuel tanks – 16,755 (+64) units.

https://en.defence-ua.com/news/808_days_of_russia_ukraine_war_russian_casualties_in_ukraine-10467.html

17 hours ago - 47°26′N 35°49′E
Ukrainian military had 91 combat engagements with Russian forces near Krasne, Morokhovets, Oliynykove, Hatysche of Kharkiv region, Synkivka, Berestove of Kharkiv region, Stelmakhivka of Luhansk region, Makiyivka of Luhansk region and Torske of Donetsk region, Bilohorivka of Luhansk region, Verkhnokamyanske, Rozdolivka, Hryhorivka, Bohdanivka, Kalynivka, Klischiyivka and Andriyivka of Donetsk region, Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Sokil, Umanske of Donetsk region, Krasnohorivka, south-west Novomykhaylivka and Solodke of Donetsk region, Staromayorske of Donetsk region and Robotyne of Zaporizhzhia region, - General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine says in the evening report

https://liveuamap.com/en/2024/10-may-ukrainian-military-had-91-combat-engagements-with

Herojam slava!

[Konnetaabeli]

Kyllähän ryzzzä osuukin joskus. Mutta mihin osuu, niin vaihtelee. Toukokuun alussa sujahti taas  lentopommi  omalle asuinalueelle Belgorodissa: 30  taloa ja 10 autoa tuhoutui, sattuuhan sitä, iso maa ja isot toleranssit.

The UK Defense Intelligence Analyzes russia's Accidental Bombing of Belgorod Region

Repeated accidental bombings highlight concerns over russian military control.

It has been reported that russian fighter aircraft accidentally released a FAB-500 munition on a civilian area in Belgorod, russia on May 4, 2024. The Belgorod Regional Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov confirmed the explosion and damage on Razdobarkina street, Belgorod without identifying the cause. 30 houses and 10 cars were damaged, with five individuals requiring hospital care, illustrating the destructive power of the munition, according to the UK Defense Intelligence.

This is not an isolated incident. On February 18, a FAB-250 munition was reportedly released on Soloti in Belgorod area which led to the evacuation of 150 residents. Media outlets suggest that such discharges are fairly common with 20 lost munitions accidentally dropped in Belgorod region alone between March to April 2024.

These instances indicate russia's continued inability to successfully employ their munitions on intended targets. Such errors have destructive and lethal consequences for the russian population.

DefExp

[Outo olio]

^Tulkitsen nimestä että olisi 500 kilon polttoaine-ilma-pommi. 30 taloa vaurioitui mutta kukaan ei kuollut? Räjähdys ei vissiin tapahtunut koko voimalla, vaan pommissa oli sytytinjärjestelmä "pois päältä"-asennossa, ja sitten pommin räjähdysaine räjähti kun pommi putosi taivaalta maahan ja pommi meni rikki. Pommi itsessään oli kunnossa, mutta pommin ripustuksessa oli jotain vikaa.

[Golimar]

X

Venäjän voitto ei tapahdu taistelukentällä vaan mielissämme, kirjoittaa arvostettu historioitsija Timothy Snyder Venäjän voitonpäivää käsittelevässä esseessään.

X

Neuvostoliiton johtaja Leonid Brežnev loi 1970-luvulla voiton kultin. Venäjän presidentti Vladimir Putin kaappasi perinteen nyky-Venäjälle ja teki siitä maan tärkeimmän juhlapäivän.

Voitonpäivä on myös pelottelua, jonka tarkoitus on saada länsimaat uskomaan, ettei Venäjä voi hävitä sotaa.

X

Käsitys voittamattomasta puna-armeijasta oli propagandaa.

X

Mikä tärkeintä, Venäjä ei ole Neuvostoliitto eikä sen armeija ole puna-armeija.

X

Venäjältä puuttuu myös länsiliittoutuneiden tarjoama taloudellinen ja materiaalinen tuki, Snyder jatkaa.

Snyderin mukaan meillä ei mitään erityistä syytä odottaa Venäjän voittavan. Siksi Venäjän ainoa mahdollisuus on yrittää estää länsimaita auttamasta Ukrainaa.

X

Viimeiset kuusi kuukautta ovat osoittaneet tämän. Snyderin mukaan Venäjän pienet voitot taistelukentällä ovat tulleet juuri silloin kun Yhdysvallat on viivyttänyt tukeaan Ukrainalle.

X

Venäjän häviö ei merkitsisi vain järjettömän tappamisen loppumista Ukrainassa.

Venäjän tappio Ukrainassa olisi venäläisille historiallinen mahdollisuus normaaliin elämään, kuten demokratiaa ja oikeusvaltiota haluavat venäläiset itse sanovat, Snyder kirjoittaa.

Ukrainalaiset ovat Snyderin mukaan oikeassa ajatellessaan, että Venäjä on kuten natsi-Saksa vuonna 1945. Se on fasistinen ja imperialistinen hallinto, joka on voitettava ja voitettavissa.

Fasismi kukistettiin viimeksi, koska liittoutuneet pysyivät lujana ja käyttivät hyväkseen taloudellista ylivoimaansa. Sama pätee nyt, Snyder arvioi.

https://www.iltalehti.fi/ulkomaat/a/92b75d73-2935-4cc6-8ede-d9cf54c72ae2

[Augustus]

ryzzzä ei saa aikaan mitään suurempaa, kunhan marssittaa mobikkeja joka päivä kuolemaan tuhatkunta kapppaletta. ryzzzäähän se ei haittaa, koska miehiä tuleee v*tusta ja rahaa voi painaa lisää kun loppuu. Mutta ei se ryzzzä sillä mitään saa aikaan.

Venäjä sanoo tuoreen huipun tulleen ukr kuolleissa ja haavoittuneissa: 1 500 per päivä. Ukr väittämä keskiarvo on tuhannen tienoossa. En halua kenenkään ottavan noita totuutena, mutta esim. Zelensky sanoo kranaattien ammuntasuhdeluvun olevan 1:10 ukr tappioksi. Miettikää tätä itse päissänne, kotona perjantai-iltana.

Attrition war on oma taiteenlajinsa.  Sota ratkeaa omien yksiköiden säilyttämisellä ja tuotannolla, ei hienoilla manöövereillä, pikavoitoilla tai joka tuumasta kiinni pitämisellä.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine

Mitä ryzzzän rakastamaan ydinaseilla heristelyyn tulee, niin sitähän se on tehnyt jo kaksi vuotta vähän väliä, kun ei muuhun pysty. Vähän niin kuin sammumispisteessä pubissa örisevä sika, joka julistaa viimeisimmällä puhekyvyllään ennen sammumistaan, että sillä on isoimmat munat, usotko?

Nyt näytti tulevan ydinaseista muistuttamisesta tulosta ja euro-napoleoneilla meni tenat vaihtoon. Viittaan aiemmin tänään postaamani.

Mielenkiintoinen artikkeli, tosin ei koko totuus. Kyllähän moni sota on ratkennut manöövereillä, kuten Lähi-Idän 1967 sota, ja miksei 1973 sota vaikkei Israelilla ole joukkoja vaikka Egyptin täydelliseen lyömiseen. Toinen suurikin ratkesi osaltaan liikuntasotana, vaikka perimmäinen ratkaisija oli tuotanto, resurssit ja väkimäärä. Todisti tietysti myöskin oikeaksi Fredrik II Suuren väittämän, että se joka puolustaa kaikkea ei puolusta mitään. Olen pitkään ajatellut, ettei Zelenski ole sisäistänyt tätä ja on pakottanut Ukrainan armeijan useamman kerran roikkumaan tietyissä kaupungeissa tuehan pitkään. Venäläiset ovat hyviä jauhamaan kohteita muuskaksi voimakkaalla tykistöllään.
Toisaalta von Falkenhayn Verdun suunnitelma (kuluttaa ranskalaiset suuressa kulutustaistelussa loppuun) kusi pahasti, tosin yhtenä merkittävänä syynä oli se, että Saksan 5. armeijaa siellä komensi kruununprinssi, joka isänsä tapaan halusi kunniaa ja maastovoittoja. Ja toisaalta ranskalaisten yllättävän sitkeä puolustus.

Tästä ensimmäisen maailmansodan viittauksessa on mielestäni asiaa, jossa kaksi sotilaallisesti samanarvoista armeijaa taistelee keskenään ja tulosta ei vaan synny. Ukraina ja Venäjä ovat armeijoiltaan melko samanlaisia (NL-perillisiä), Venäjällä on materiaalinen ylivoima, mutta Ukrainalla sittemmin paremmat lännen aseet (ainakin jonkinverran). Venäjän armeijan johtamiskulttuuri on luultavasti sama kuin Ukrainan, vaikka tätä ei saisi ehkä sanoa.

Idea on kuitenkin se, että sodassa voittaa se, jolla on jotain ylivoimaista vastustajaan nähden. Ajatusleikkinä voisi ajatella USA:n sotaa jotain kopio-USA2-valtiota vastaan, jolla on ihan sama aseistus, henkilöstö, patriotismi jne. Konventionaalisessa sodassa luultavasti saataisiin aikaan jotain WWI,  Iran-Irak tai Venäjä-Ukraina-tyyppistä junnaamista joka ei johda mihinkään, mutta sotilaita kuolee ja kalustoa menetetään, mutta mitään valmista ei tule.

[Konnetaabeli]

Suurena luovan kulttuurin maana ryzzzä on kehittänyt ns. kokeilevan taiteen pommituksen. Sinne tänne tipahtelevista pommeista joku jopa saattaa aiheuttaa vihollisellekin tuhoa.

Aihetta ovat ihmetelleet niin ukr. kuin brittitiedustelu:

British intelligence: "Loss" of bombs by Russian planes on way to Ukraine indicates systemic problem

There are numerous cases in Russia when their aircraft accidentally lose ammunition on their territory when flying to attack targets in Ukraine, which indicates a systemic problem that poses a problem for civilians.
This was reported by the British Ministry of Defence on social media platform X, citing intelligence data, Ukrinform reports.

The ministry recalled several cases when Russian fighter jets accidentally dropped ammunition when flying to attack the territory of Ukraine. For example, on 4 May 2024, a Russian fighter jet accidentally dropped a FAB-500 munition on a civilian area in Belgorod. At the time, the governor of the Belgorod region confirmed that there had been an explosion, damaging 30 houses and 10 cars and injuring five people, without giving a reason.

On 18 February, a FAB-250 was released at the Soloty test site in Belgorod Oblast, leading to the evacuation of 150 residents. The intelligence service cites media analysis that such releases are quite common: 20 munitions were accidentally dropped in Belgorod region alone between March and April 2024.

"These incidents demonstrate Russia's continued failure to successfully use its munitions as intended. Such mistakes have devastating and deadly consequences for the Russian population," the ministry concludes.


As Ukrinform reported, in April last year, a Russian Su-34 aircraft accidentally dropped a munition on the city of Belgorod, which led to an explosion and damage.

And at the beginning of this year, Russian aircraft dropped two bombs on the Belgorod region of the Russian Federation: FAB-250 and FAB-500. Residents of one village had to be evacuated.

A month later, Belgorod Oblast again experienced an "abnormal munitions drop" near the Ukrainian border, and an X59 missile was found in a field near the village of Krasne.

UkrInform

[Miniluv]

Venäjä-Ukraina-tyyppistä junnaamista joka ei johda mihinkään, mutta sotilaita kuolee ja kalustoa menetetään, mutta mitään valmista ei tule.

Toinen puoli ei pysty liikuttamaan rintamaa, ja toinen haluaa ensin tuhota vastuksen, ja liikuttaa vasta sitten (kts. attrition wsr ylempämä). Tulee valmista, kun "tarpeeksi" kuolee. Ja Ukrainan puolella se on valtavan paljon lähempänä.

[Miniluv]

^Tulkitsen nimestä että olisi 500 kilon polttoaine-ilma-pommi.

FAB (Free-fall Aerial Bomb) glide bombs are a class of unguided munitions

https://themilitarysummary.com/the-devastating-impact-of-fab-glide-bombs/

[Augustus]

Venäjä-Ukraina-tyyppistä junnaamista joka ei johda mihinkään, mutta sotilaita kuolee ja kalustoa menetetään, mutta mitään valmista ei tule.

Toinen puoli ei pysty liikuttamaan rintamaa, ja toinen haluaa ensin tuhota vastuksen, ja liikuttaa vasta sitten (kts. attrition wsr ylempämä). Tulee valmista, kun "tarpeeksi" kuolee. Ja Ukrainan puolella se on valtavan paljon lähempänä.

Niin, se mun lauseeni tarkoitti kahta samanlaista sotaa käyvää valtiota, jolloin sotiminen ei johda mihinkään.

Kulutussota Venäjän ja Ukrainan välillä johtaa todennäköisesti Ukrainan tappioon. Idea oli se, että jos armeijat ovat kyviltään samanlaisia, niin taistelukentällä ei synny ratkaisua, vaan ratkaisu sodassa perustuu taloudelliseen kykyyn tuottaa aseita ja kuinka paljon valtio pystyy marssittamaan sotilaita taistelukentälle. Tämä on siis se totaalisen sodan käsite, jossa valtio ei häviä sotaa hetkessä tai muutamassa taistelussa, koska sotaan voidaan aina roudata uusia sotilaita ja kalustoa.

[Konnetaabeli]

Tuiki tuiki tähtönen...

ryzzzän öljynjalostamot  ja -varastot palavat kuin Espoon autiotalot:

ATACMS Missile Blasts Oil Depot in Occupied Luhansk

In the latest strike targeting Russian fuel-making or storage facilities, Ukraine has reportedly used a US-made long-range missile to hit territory occupied by Russia since 2014.

Several explosions were reported at an oil depot in the city of Rovenky, in the occupied Luhansk region, late in the evening yesterday, May 10.

Preliminary reports and videos being shared on social media channels from Rovenky, which Russia occupied in 2014, indicate that at least one M39 ATACMS tactical ballistic missile with cluster munitions was used to strike the facility.


Moscow-installed head of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People's Republic confirmed that one person was killed and six others wounded.

Rovenky is 115 kilometers east of the front lines and 60 kilometers south of Luhansk.

If Ukraine is confirmed responsible for the attack, then it would represent the latest in a series of strikes on Russian oil refineries and depots.

KyivPost

[Tunkki]

UKR-sakin paras suoritus eilen/toissapnä oli niillä ultrakevyillä siviilikoneilla jotka on tuunattu droneksi särkeä öljynjalostamo 1400km päässä ukr. rajalta Jossain siellä syvällä vennään maalla.

[Ari-Lee]

Russia at war! Day 52.

809 ​Days of russia-Ukraine War – russian Casualties In Ukraine
May 12, 2024

Personnel – 482,290 (+1260),
Tanks – 7,454 (+5) units,
APV – 14,375 (+22) units,
Artillery systems – 12,472 (+30) units,
MLRS – 1066 (+2) units,
Anti-aircraft warfare systems – 797 (+1) units,
Aircraft – 350 (+1) units,
Helicopters – 325 (+0) units,
UAV operational-tactical level – 9,910 (+42) units,
Cruise missiles – 2,194 (+1) units,
Boats / warships – 26 (+0) units,
Submarines – 1 (+0)
Special equipment – 2,042 (+2) units,
Vehicles and fuel tanks – 16,819 (+64) units.

https://en.defence-ua.com/news/809_days_of_russia_ukraine_war_russian_casualties_in_ukraine-10478.html

19 hours ago - 46°44′N 33°7′E
Ukrainian military had 108 combat engagements with Russian forces near Strilecha, Krasne, Morokhovets, Oliynykove, Lukyantsi, Hatysche, Pletenivka of Kharkiv region, Synkivka, Novoyehorivka, Ivanivka of Kharkiv region, Stelmakhivka of Luhansk region, Makiyivka, Nevske and Serebryanske forestry of Luhansk region, Terny of Donetsk region, Bilohorivka of Luhansk region, Verkhnokamyanske, Spirne, Vyyimka, Rozdolivka, Andriyivka, Ivanivske, Chasiv Yar, Hryhorivka, Novyy of Donetsk region, Novooleksandrivka, Yevhenivka, Sokil, Novopokrovske, Novoselivka Persha, Semenivka, Umanske, Netaylove of Donetsk region, Kostyantynivka, Krasnohorivka, Vodyane, Urozhayne, Staromayorske of Donetsk region and Robotyne of Zaporizhzhia region, Krynky of Kherson region, - General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine says in the evening report

https://liveuamap.com/en/2024/11-may-ukrainian-military-had-108-combat-engagements-with

Herojam slava!

[Ari-Lee]

UKR-sakin paras suoritus eilen/toissapnä oli niillä ultrakevyillä siviilikoneilla jotka on tuunattu droneksi särkeä öljynjalostamo 1400km päässä ukr. rajalta Jossain siellä syvällä vennään maalla.

Yep:

3 days ago - 54°42′N 35°57′E
Fire at the refinery in Kaluga region after drone strike

https://liveuamap.com/en/2024/10-may-fire-at-the-refinery-in-kaluga-region-after-drone

Toissapäivänä tussahti Luhanskissa:

2 days ago - 48°5′N 39°21′E
Missile strike reported at oil depot in Rovenky, occupied part of Luhansk region of Ukraine

https://liveuamap.com/en/2024/10-may-missile-strike-reported-at-oil-depot-in-rovenky-occupied

Eilen tuhoutui polttoainejuna Rostovissa:

a day ago - 47°0′N 42°12′E
Several tanker cars of a freight train derailed at the Kuberle station in the Rostov region. The fire at the scene of the emergency has already been extinguished

https://liveuamap.com/en/2024/11-may-several-tanker-cars-of-a-freight-train-derailed-at

Ja tänään kaukana Volgogradissa:

8 hours ago - 48°30′N 44°36′E
Drones have attacked refinery in Volgograd, causing fire

https://liveuamap.com/en/2024/12-may-drones-have-attacked-refinery-in-volgograd-causing

[Konnetaabeli]

p-korean ryzzzälle myymät ohjukset taitavat olla hyvin yhteensopivia ryzzzän systeemien kanssa = samaa paskalaatua kuin ryzzzän jo omalle alueelle putoilevat pommit. ryzzzien ampumista p-korean puikoista yli puolet on räjähtänyt puolimatkassa saavuttamatta kohdettaan.

Half N.Korean KN-23 Missiles Exploded Mid-Flight in Ukraine – Reuters

The findings potentially point to the industrial capabilities of north korea and russia to boot

Inquired by Reuters, the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine disclosed data on russia's use of KN-23 ballistic missiles from north korea. According to the Ukrainian authorities, the last attack of Ukraine with Pyongyang's missiles was recorded on February 27, 2024.

Ukrainian researchers retrieved and studied remnants of 21 ballistic missiles from DPRK, even though there were 50 launches aimed at Ukraine recorded. This indicates that over half of north korean missiles fired by russians exploded midair without reaching their targets.

DefExp

[duc]

Uusi pohjoisrintama lienee syntymässä, kun R-sana hyökkää valtiorajan yli Harkovan ja Belgorodin välissä ->liitekuva. Aiheeseen liityvä uutinen:

https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000010421329.html

BBC: Ukrainalais­komentaja ihmettelee Harkovan alueen tapahtumia: "Se oli petos"
Ukrainan armeijan komentaja kertoo BBC:lle, kuinka helposti Venäjän joukot pääsivät etenemään Harkovan alueella.




Kirsi Jääskeläinen
8:38
UKRAINAN erikoisjoukkojen komentaja Denis Jaroslavskyi kertoo BBC:lle, että Ukrainan etulinjan puolustus on pettänyt pahemman kerran Harkovan alueella viime päivinä.

– Venäläiset vain kävelivät sisään, hän kuvaili.

Sekä Ukrainan että lännen tiedustelutieto on jo aiemmin osannut kertoa, että Venäjä tulee yrittämään massiivista hyökkäystä Harkovan suunnalla. Venäjä oli koonnut rajan läheisyyteen lähes 30 000 miehistön. Venäjä on halunnut luoda alueelle puskurivyöhykkeen estämään Ukrainan iskuja.

Jaroslavskyi sanoo, että viranomaiset olivat väittäneet, että puolustusta rakennettiin valtavilla kustannuksilla, mutta hänen mielestään näitä puolustuksia ei yksinkertaisesti ollut.

– Joko se oli huolimattomuutta tai korruptiota. Se ei ollut epäonnistuminen. Se oli petos.

- -

[duc]

Ukrainan joukoille uusi komentaja Harkovan rintamalle:

Ukraina erotti Harkovan alueen joukkoja komentavan prikaatinkenraalin

Ukraina on erottanut Harkovan alueen pohjoisosista vastaavan OUV-yksikön sotilaskomentajan, prikaatinkenraali Juri Halushkinin. Asiasta kertoi maanantaina Ukrainan RBK-uutistoimistolle maavoimien alaisten Hortytsja-joukkojen tiedottaja Naza Volyshin.

Voloshynin mukaan päätös Halushkinin syrjään siirtämisestä tehtiin lauantaina. Tilalle nimitetään prikaatinkenraali Myhailo Drapatyi.

Venäjä käynnisti perjantaina hyökkäyksen rajan yli Harkovan alueelle. Ukrainassa on kritisoitu alueen puolustuslinjojen heikkoutta.

Taistelut ovat jatkuneet viikonloppuna ja maanantaina rajuina rajaseudun taajamissa. Harkovan alueen sotilashallinnon johtaja Oleh Synjehubov varoitti aiemmin maanantaina, että taistelut uhkaavat levitä alueilla useampiin asutuskeskuksiin.

https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000010421668.html