Open Society Foundation: Somalis in Amsterdam

[Kemolitor]

Neljäs OSF:n somaliraportti on ilmestynyt, Somalis in Amsterdam:
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/somalis-amsterdam

Itse raportti (pdf):
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/somalis-amsterdam-20140408.pdf

Nelisivuinen tiivistelmä:
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/somalis-amsterdam-summary-20140402.pdf

Lyhyt kertaus tähän asti tapahtuneesta:
Somaleilla menee Suomessa huonosti, kouluttautuminen ei suju eikä töitä löydy, syinä ennen kaikkea syrjintä ja rasismi. Liian pieniä asuntoja tarjotaan ja kielikin on vaikea oppia. Oslossa ja Malmössä meni myös somaleilla huonosti, jopa muihin maahanmuuttajaryhmiin verrattaessa.

Aloin jännityksellä tavailemaan yhteenvetoa. Tämän ja monien muiden alojen asiantuntijan Umayya Abu-Hannan mukaan Hollannissa ei ole rasismia eikä syrjintää, joten tulosten pitäisi olla aivan erilaisia kuin esimerkiksi Suomessa.

Mutta mutta, ei hyvältä näytä kun yhteenvetoa katsoo, menohan on aivan samanlaista kuin aikaisemmissa raporteissa:

Somalis have some of the lowest education levels among refugee groups, with nearly 30 percent of Somali women in particular having no education at all.

School dropouts remain high among Somalis, but the number has declined considerably in the past 10 years.

With just under 30 percent of Somalis reporting a paid job in the Netherlands, labour market participation is low. Most of those with a job work at less skilled levels. Women face specific problems of labour market access: their education is worse, they are less likely to be proficient in Dutch

A lack of financial planning and, consequently, debt has been noted as problems for Somali households. Many of the households support their relatives in Somalis, which is a burden on the household budget.

In Amsterdam, there are long waiting lists for social housing, and the supply for large families is limited.

Somalis are overrepresented in crime statistics, particularly unaccompanied minors, who have no family in the country to support or guide them.

The recent prohibition on khat has had an impact on the Somali community

In terms of how Somalis are featured in Dutch media, piracy appeared most often in a six-month monitoring of Somali-related news, and overall, negative representations of Somalis dominated.

No, pitää lukea rauhassa koko raportti, jos sieltä vaikka jotain uutta ja yllättävää paljastuisi.

Ketjut muista OSF:n somaliraporteista:
Somalis in Helsinki
Somalis in Oslo
Somalis in Malmö

[huhha]

Valaiseva tiedote tutkimuksen rahoittajalta: http://www.taloussanomat.fi/raha/2014/04/08/kun-naen-kuplan-lisaan-bensaa-liekkeihin/20145047/139.

[foobar]

Miksipä sitä kouluttautuisi kun antisosiaalisella käyttäytymisellä, varkauksilla ja ryöstöillä pätevöityy Suomen kirkkaimmaksi nuorisoelokuvatähdeksi. Tärkeintä on että on somali joka ei halua sopeutua Suomeen.

[Kemolitor]

Valaiseva tiedote tutkimuksen rahoittajalta: http://www.taloussanomat.fi/raha/2014/04/08/kun-naen-kuplan-lisaan-bensaa-liekkeihin/20145047/139.

Itse asiassa tuo otsikko:
"Kun näen kuplan, lisään bensaa liekkeihin"
sopii oikein hyvin näihin somaliraportteihin.

Yhden raportin jälkeen olisi voitu vielä tyytyä rasismi-syrjintä -selityksiin, mutta kun aivan vastaavansisältöisiä raportteja tulee eri maista, niin herää epäilys, että onko rasismista ja syrjinnästä puhuminen somalien osalta vain kupla, joka sitten puhkeaa kun vertaillaan heidän tilannettaan eri maissa.

[Rusinapulla]

Maailmassa on erilaisia kulttuureja ja se on rikkaus ja voimavara jota pitää osata hyödyntää.

[Kemolitor]

Tässä poimintoja tekstistä, ei sieltä kyllä oikein mitään yllättävää ja erikoista löytynyt aikaisempiin raportteihin verrattuna:


Luku 2. Population and demographics s. 22 - 29

s. 22: The first 10 Somali asylum seekers in the Netherlands arrived in 1984, fleeing Siad Barre's repressive regime.1 A first real peak of Somali arrivals in the Netherlands occurred in 1995, some years after the fall of Siad Barre's regime in 1991.

Most of the Somalis who arrived in the Netherlands in the 1990s came from urban areas in the north of Somalia and were well educated; many diplomats, businessmen and other highly educated people arrived in the Dutch asylum seekers centres.

A second period of Somali immigration into the Netherlands took place around 2007 as a result of the crisis in the south of Somalia.

In contrast with the first group of Somali arrivals, the majority of the recent newcomers have had little or no education and they all have had the experience of living in a country at war.

The official number of Somalis in the Netherlands fluctuates between 20,000 and 30,000. On 1 January 2013 the number of Somalis officially residing in Dutch municipalities was 33,750.

Even though Somalis have felt safe and welcome in the Netherlands and they are grateful for the refugee status they have received, the Netherlands is still perceived as a place of transit by many.

Ihan mukava, että Hollannissa somalit älyävät olla kiitollisisia heille annetusta pakolaisasemasta.

In 2009 the Dutch government decided to cancel its categorical protection policy for Somalis from central and south Somalia, protection that had been implemented between 2005 and 2009 and meant that asylum cases from Somalia were determined collectively rather than on a case-by-case basis. The reason for cancelling this policy was the alleged abuse of the system and the increase of children where it was not clear whether they truly were part of a (nuclear) family already residing in the Netherlands. Social benefits fraud and even fingertip mutilation to avoid fingerprint matching were also cited as a basis for the cancellation of the categorical policy.

Hollanti siis antoi vuosina 2005-2009 automaattisesti turvapaikan somaleille, järjestelmän hyväksikäyttö, laaja perhekäsitys, sosiaalitukien väärinkäyttö ym. johtivat sitten tämän automaatin lopettamiseen. En muista, että Suomessa olisi tullut vastaan tätä sormenpäiden leikkelyä sormenjälkien ottamisen estämiseksi.


Luku 3. Policy context s. 30 - 43

Increasingly, a normative framework on integration and Dutch citizenship has been imposed in the hope that this will increase shared citizenship and loyalty and identification with Dutch society. At the same time, it is striking that politicians are unable to clearly define what this "Dutchness" is, and what are the typical values and rules of conduct to which immigrants must adapt and integrate.

Suomessa pohditaan, mitä on suomalaisuus, Hollannissa pohditaan, mitä on hollantilaisuus.

The integration debate intensified after 9/11 when the Netherlands was confronted with a surprisingly high incidence of violent attacks on mosques and an increase in aggressive behaviour towards individual Muslims. In 2002 Pim Fortuyn, a Dutch right-wing politician who advocated a stricter immigration policy and far-reaching integration policies, was murdered and the country was in deep shock. In 2004, a Dutch film director, Theo van Gogh, was murdered by a Dutch citizen of Moroccan heritage who objected to his work for religious reasons.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali on saanut oman tekstilaatikon:

Born in 1967 in Mogadishu, Ayaan Hirsi Ali came to the Netherlands as a refugee in 1992. Hirsi Ali received a residence permit within three weeks of her arrival in the Netherlands. Her apparent untruths, however, have raised doubts about other elements of her biography that lack documentary or circumstantial evidence.

Ayaan graduated in political science in the Netherlands and was active in the Labour Party till 2002 when she switched to the Liberal Party. She became a member of the Dutch Parliament for the Liberal Party in 2003. During this period she made controversial statements about Islam, for example calling Islam a backward religion and saying that "by Western standards Muhammad would be considered a pedophile". A discrimination complaint was filed against her on 24 April 2003. The Prosecutor's office, however, decided not to initiate a case, because her critique did "not put forth any conclusions in respect to Muslims and their worth as a group is not denied". Her attacks on Islam as a religion and the Islamic communities in the Netherlands alienated her from many of the Muslim women for whom she says she claims to speak.

The film she made with Theo van Gogh was a critique on women's position in Islamic society, but considered blasphemous by many Muslims all over the world. A letter pinned to Van Gogh's body by the murderer with a knife was primarily a death threat to Ayaan Hirsi Ali. She went into hiding. In 2006 a television programme called "Zembla" reported that Hirsi Ali had given false information about her real name, her age and the country she arrived from when originally applying for asylum. She had claimed to be fleeing the war in Somalia. However, she had been legally resident in Kenya for many years. Hirsi Ali admitted that she had lied about her full name, her date of birth and the manner in which she had come to the Netherlands, but said that she had fabricated this story while fleeing from a forced marriage.

Former Minister for Integration and Immigration Rita Verdonk decided to take away Hirsi Ali's citizenship because it was proved not to be legitimate. Hirsi Ali eventually moved to the United States to work for a conservative think-tank, the American Enterprise Institute.

Hollannissa saapujan katsotaan itse olevan vastuussa integroitumisestaan:

Current integration policies in the Netherlands have a strong assimilationist character. This is also reflected in the "Integration Agenda" of the newly elected government (2013), which explicitly states that newcomers have primary responsibility for becoming integrated, and for acquiring the knowledge and skills necessary to build up a new future in the Netherlands. This agenda builds strongly upon previous policies.

The policies are regulated in the first place by the Newcomers' Citizenship Act 2007. Under this act integration has a more compulsory character; newcomers are required to take an integration course (inburgeringscursus). The main components of this course are language classes and classes on Dutch culture and society, so that newcomers become familiar with Dutch values, traditions and procedures.

If newcomers do not pass the integration examination within three years, their residence permit can be withdrawn. Asylum seekers and pastors or imams do have special positions, as they will still receive some assistance during the integration process. Asylum seekers will not lose their residence permit if they do not pass the civic integration course. Furthermore, if they pass the exam they do not have to pay back the loan they received to take the course.

Tuo laina-asia kuulostaa aika mielenkiintoiselta, siitä varmaan tulee myöhemmin tarkempaa tietoa.

Once they receive a permit, they must leave the AZC and are dispersed to a municipality to live in. Municipalities are required to host refugees, they cannot deny access and must provide housing. The refugee receives support while involved in the civic integration process, including language training, and gets access to welfare and health care.

s. 39: Somalis may be satisfied with the programme at first, but when it becomes clear that their high and sometimes unrealistic expectations of job opportunities are not always met, it may lead to disappointment and even migration to the UK.

Tulokset eivät kuitenkaan ole somaleilla olleet kehuttavia:

s. 39: Apart from specific programme issues, several sources reported that the results vary greatly. According to a study by Dalmar, a Somali organisation based in The Hague, the level of Dutch proficiency among Somalis who arrived in the Netherlands after 2006, is very low: 80 percent of this group hardly speaks Dutch. Although the group that arrived in 2007 scores a bit better, nevertheless 75 percent of this group does not speak or hardly speaks Dutch.

Varsinkin somalinaisilla on vaikeata. Miehet katsovat, ettei naisten tarvitse oppia hollantia, lasten synnyttäminen sotkee opiskelua, rahaakaan ei ole, jotta pääsisi bussilla kurssille.

s. 40: Another problem concerns the delays in the civic integration trajectories observed by local client managers. This concerns women in particular, including some Somali women, where their husbands do not see the need for their wives to participate in the training: "'There is no need for her to speak Dutch' is an often heard argument," according to an integration official with the local government. Difficulties finding a good day care centre for their children and pregnancy also pose obstacles. During their maternity leave most women hardly practise Dutch, and although they continue after their maternity leave, they need some additional months to catch up again, to reach their previous proficiency level. Financial problems can also result in delays: it has been reported that Somali women do not attend their training because they do not have money to pay for public transport to get there.

s. 41: The implications of the Revised Civic Integration Act that came into force in January 2013 are still not clear. This new law stipulates that newcomers must take greater responsibility for their civic integration. They have to organise and pay for the programme themselves, and pass the exam succesfully within three years. After successful lobbying by the Dutch Council for Refugees/Amsterdam, special provisions were made for refugees. They are given a loan to cover the cost of the course; however, they do not have to repay it if they pass the exam within three years. Under the new law it is the newcomers' responsibility to pass the exam. If they do not pass the exam within three years they have to pay a higher rate for their permit or it can even be withdrawn, implying that people may have to leave the country; however, this last condition does not apply to refugees.

Mitenkähän Umayya Abu-Hanna on pärjännyt tässä testissä, kai hänenkin se pitää suorittaa.

[Kemolitor]

Luku 4. Identity and belonging s. 44 - 52

Somalit eivät halua olla hollantilaisia, he ovat muslimeja ja somaleja:

s. 43: In conversations on identity and the role of the city, most focus group participants emphasised the importance of their other identities, Muslim and Somali, which appear to be more important to them than being a resident of Amsterdam.

First I am Somali, than Muslim, and then Dutch. I do not have anything to do with Amsterdam. (Male student, 25 years old)

This finding contrasts with other more long-standing minority groups where studies have found that the Amsterdam identity is very strong and binding for young people with Moroccan, Turkish and Surinamese backgrounds who were born in Amsterdam. The Amsterdam identity is an important way to distinguish themselves from the rest of the Netherlands, which they associate with wooden shoes and windmills.

Mutta somalit eivät ole afrikkalaisiakaan:

Interestingly, most respondents saw themselves not as Africans, although the younger generation was more inclined to be open to this. They pointed to a feeling of distance from Africa and other Africans among their parents:

They feel better than other Africans, consider other Africans as inferior - to a certain extent; like Somali is an island that does not want to belong to Africa.
(25-year-old male student)

Turvapaikkahaastatteluissa juksaaminen voi olla henkisesti raskasta:

s. 47: Some studies have stated that Somalis have to invent and maintain a fictional story, which can be confusing, in particular for their children, who do not know where they really belong.

s. 48: The Somalis in Amsterdam have strong transnational contacts. They remit money to relatives in Somalia and have frequent phone contact.

Recent studies counter the dominant view of the link between transnational engagement and integration, which is that migrants who have close ties with their countries of origin are not integrating in their countries of settlement.

Huolestuttavana piirteenä uudessa integraatiopolitiikassa nähdään se vaara, että somalit muuttavat johonkin monikulttuurisempaan yhteiskuntaan:

s. 49: Furthermore, the lack of cultural and religious opportunities in the Netherlands and the imposed integration policies make Somalis want to move to a more multicultural environment with greater possibilities to express ethnic and religious identity.

Luku 5. Education s. 53 - 61

Huonolla tolalla on somalien koulutustilanne Hollannissa:

s. 53: The educational level of Somalis is relatively low, in particular when compared to the educational level of other refugees groups in the Netherlands. The majority (30 percent) has primary education as the highest educational level attained,75 while 28 percent did not have any education at all.76 Women dominate this last group, with 62 percent of Somali women also having received no education at all.

Ja huonompaan suuntaan ollaan menossa:

s. 54: Overall, the educational level of the Somali population in the Netherlands has decreased over time: the proportion of people without secondary education increased from 55 percent to 58 percent in 2009, and the proportion of people with a higher or academic education decreased during the same period from 8 percent to 5 cent.

Onneksi sentään Amterdamista löytyy islamilaisia kouluja:

The main reason respondents gave for opting for an Islamic school is that this fits the values and norms of Islam and Somali parenting traditions better, while other parents opt for the best school in combination with the open character of a public school. They do so by checking the reviews published by the Ministry for Education. There are six Islamic primary schools in Amsterdam, three in city district West, two in Nieuw West, and one in Zuid Oost.

12 ikävuodesta eteenpäin ei Amterdamissa ole enää tarjolla islamilaista koulua, rassisti-fassistit sulkivat sen 2011:

s. 55: Precise information on the schools attended by Somali pupils in Amsterdam is not available. There is no Islamic secondary school in Amsterdam, after the only Islamic school, the Islamic College Amsterdam, closed in 2011 due to financial problems. This followed the decision of the Minister of Education in 2010 to stop funding the school, because of the poor quality of education. In 2011, there was an initiative for a new Islamic secondary school in Amsterdam supported by the Minister of Education. However, progress in setting this up was in part blocked by the Municipality of Amsterdam as they did not want to facilitate the provision of a school building.

Koulukin jää somaleilla helposti kesken:

s. 57: The proportion of dropouts, that is, pupils leaving school without a basic qualification, is still high among Somali youngsters,

Rasistiopettajat estävät somalinuorten tulevan lääkärin tai lakimiehen uran:

s. 58: Somali parents expect their children to become doctors or lawyers, and are disappointed when they realise they need to adjust their ambitions, are angry about the teachers' advice to go to the VMBO because they feel their child can do better.

[Kemolitor]

Luku 6. Employment s. 62 - 71

Labour market participation among Somalis is relatively low; data at the national level reveal that approximately 29 percent of Somalis have a paid job. Labour market participation among Somali women is particularly low: in 2009, 17 percent of women in the age group 15 – 65 had a job.

Self-employment, that is having your own company, is not found in the national statistics concerning the Somalis, with 0.8 percent of the population in the age group 15–64 being self-employed.

s. 64: Jobs are generally in the lower segments of the labour market: men mentioned cleaning, manufacturing and the flower auction in Aalsmeer. Women are involved in cleaning, and the care sector, such as elderly care.

Hollantikin paljastuu rasistiseksi ja syrjiväksi maaksi. Työpaikoilla vaaditaan hollannin kielen taitoa:

There are many reasons for Somalis' vulnerable position in the labour market. First, language is a problem, in particular for those who arrived after 2006. Although some of the men do speak some Dutch, their proficiency is not adequate and is a serious obstacle in the search for work.

Lisää syrjintää, Somaliassa suoritettu koneinsinööritutkin ei kelpaakaan Hollannissa:

s. 65: Both men and women discovered that the integration certificate did not guarantee a job: additional training and education was necessary to prepare for the labour market. Some interviewees found that their Somali or Kenyan certificates were often not recognised, and they were obliged to take additional training in the Netherlands, although they possessed relevant qualifications.

Syrjintä vain jatkuu: naisilla huivin käyttö häiritsee työn saamista:

One of their cases concerned a woman who was refused a job because of her headscarf. Indeed, clothing is a factor that can influence access to the labour market. Examples mentioned in the interviews and focus group discussions included refusal of jobs because of the dress of the applicant.

Tension between the expression of religion and work was mentioned frequently, showing different experiences.

The structure of the Dutch labour market, with entrance requirements based on formal education, was also frequently referred to as problematic for Somalis. As neither their formal certificates nor their informal qualifications are recognised, it is hard to find a job.

s. 67: Not much is known about the financial position of Somalis. In 2005, over 50 percent of Somali households had a low income, of around €850 per month.107 As noted in section 6.1 above, a large group of Somalis are not in paid employment. Many of them can be classified as unemployed: they are not in paid work, but would like to be. Others can be classified as economically inactive, that is, outside the labour force. There are several reasons for this: poor health or disability (18 percent), studies (33 percent), school (15 percent) and – most important – child care (25 percent). The Dutch welfare system is the main source of income for this last group.

Sossun tädit eivät pidä rahalähetyksistä:

s. 68: She checks all my expenses, I need to tell her exactly how I spent the money. Two months ago, I sent €100 to my family in Somalia, it was months ago that I did so, and since they take care of my child, I just couldn't wait any longer ... well, she accused me of being too generous. (42-year-old woman)

Tulevaisuuden hahmottaminen on somaleille vaikeata:

According to some experts, financial planning constitutes a large problem for many households. They are not used to planning expenses, and find it difficult to do long-term planning.

We had some clients, young couples, who arrived in the city, and started a family: one child, another one, and then they ran into problems, did not expect that having children affects the household income, that you need to buy food, diapers, buy medication in case the child is ill, etc. It is not a case of deliberate bad planning, they are just not aware of the system, how it works.

Vähistä rahoista pitää vielä sitten osa lähettää Somaliaan:

Supporting the family in Somalia, particularly parents, is also a burden on many household budgets, as they remit a substantial part of their income to family and friends in Somalia back home. This practice is part of Somali culture and tradition, an Islamic duty and hard to avoid.

Sometimes you visit your clients at home, in their apartment, and then you notice their shabby conditions, only a few chairs, etc. All refugees receive a loan, to furnish their apartment, but sometimes they do not spend it on furniture, they send it to Somalia, to support their families which are highly depended on
these funds.

Luku 7. Housing s. 72 - 77

Hollannissa turvapaikan saaneet hajasijoitetaan eri kuntiin. Kunnilla on velvollisuus ottaa pakolaisia vastaan ja tarjota asunto:

Those asylum seekers who succeed in obtaining refugee status in the Netherlands are helped to find suitable housing by the COA. In the past this often took a long time, although municipalities are obliged to offer appropriate accommodation to refugees within three months. Refugees can try to state their preferences for where they would like to live, but only in cases of medical urgency is this taken into account. The dwellings offered to refugees can be located anywhere in the Netherlands.

Somali refugees like to live together, but they cannot always succeed. In the Netherlands we have a dispersal policy. We, as the Dutch Council for Refugees, can help to negotiate in urgent individual cases. But we cannot do a lot because almost everybody wants to live in the larger cities and that is just impossible.

Each municipality in the Netherlands is thus legally required to host a number of refugees, depending on the number of inhabitants of the municipality (its "housing target", de huisvestings taakstelling). The result of this dispersal policy is that refugees are scattered all over the Netherlands and often isolated from family members and friends. It is estimated that around 60 percent of refugees do make use of the offers made by municipalities. Refugees are not obliged to make use of this housing system, they can also look for a house themselves.

Hollannin syrjivä pankkijärjestelmä estää somaleja ostamasta asuntoa. Muslimi ei voi maksaa lainasta korkoa eikä Hollannista löydy korotonta lainaa antavia pankkeja:

During one of the focus groups it became clear that it is difficult for some Somalis to buy a house due to the lack of banks in the Netherlands that provide mortgages regarded as halal, that is, compliant with their religious principles relating to the charging of interest on loans. Somali families with sufficient income that have lost their rights to the social housing sector are limited to the private housing market with its very high rents.

Hollanti ei edes tarjoa isoille somaliperheille kunnollisen kokoisia asuntoja:

s. 75: The number of rooms available per household is also the lowest for the Somali population (3.3 compared with 3.9 for Afghans). This again can be explained by demographics, but it might also indicate that Somalis' housing situation is worse than that of other refugee groups because Somali families are often large.

Luku 8. Health and social protection s. 78 - 90

s. 80: Somalis' low use of health and social services could of course be an indicator of good health, but based on insights from qualitative research about Somalis' health, it seems more likely that they experience barriers to accessing health care.

s. 82: Concerns were also raised about the increasing costs of health insurance in the Netherlands. Focus group participants pointed out that taking care of and sending money to relatives in Somalia or paying the rent came before personal health.

Tulkkipalvelut taitavat olla Hollannissa huonommalla tasolla kuin Suomessa:

Language problems appear to be at the root of many misunderstandings between clients and doctors. Doctors in asylum seeker centres need to work with interpreters, in hospitals there are often interpreters as well, but in general, doctors usually do not have a budget to bring in interpreters. In that case people are asked to bring someone who can interpret for them, which obviously is not ideal.

Varsinkin henkisten vaivojen ilmaantuessa Koraanin lukeminen auttaa parhaiten:

s. 83: When Somalis do not feel welcome or understood by Dutch health-care workers they may look for alternative solutions. Imams play an important role in curing people in the Somali culture.

If someone develops mental illness it may be interpreted in a traditional way. So rather than calling the hospital or the psychiatrist, they may opt for a Koran reading. The imam will read the Koran to this person to calm him/her down and it may work for a while, but it is no long-term solution.

Oma maa kullan kallis, varsinkin jos lapsilla viiraa päästä:

s. 84: Sometimes children with mental health or other problems are sent back to Somalia because their parents do not trust the Dutch care system and fear that the problems will only become worse in the unfamiliar Dutch context.

Somali women face one specific health problem: female genital mutilation (FGM), also known as female circumcision or female genital cutting. The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines FGM as "all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons." The practice came to the Netherlands in the 1990s, with immigration from countries where FGM is practised, including Somalia. At the moment it is estimated that there are around 30,000 women with FGM living in the Netherlands. Most of them are from Somalia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea or Kurdish Iraq.

In the reception centres 35 percent of all women have undergone FGM, most of whom fall within the reproductive age. The situation requires discussion among doctors and other health-care workers.

In 1993 the Dutch government officially declared all forms of female genital mutilation as intolerable and forbidden in the Netherlands.

If FGM is carried out by one of the parents, the prison term can be increased by one-third. In cases where the parents arrange the procedure, pay or provide means that will be used for FGM, or assist during FGM, they are liable as well.

The risk of FGM, however, remains high when families visit their home country. Estimates of the number of girls who have the operation in their country of origin are between 40 and 50 girls a year for all children in the Netherlands coming from risk countries.

s. 86: Another specific health risk for Somalis is tuberculosis. The Association of Community Health Services (GGGD) in the Netherlands recently started a project on tuberculosis in collaboration with Pharos. Somalis tend to suffer from tuberculosis quite often, which obviously is a health risk for the whole society.

Somaliaan ei ole turvallista palata, mutta lapset sinne voi lähettämään oppimaan oikeiksi somaleiksi:

s. 88: According to respondents, some Somali parents send their children to Somalia to reacquaint them with that culture. Others suggested that this is a more common practice in the UK than in the Netherlands.

Luku 9. Policing and security s. 91 - 98

s. 93: A 2003 study on criminality among ethnic groups found that some groups in the Netherlands appeared to be overrepresented in crime figures, including Somalis.

Mutta ei valiteta, Englannissa taitaa olla vielä huonompi tilanne:

s. 93: If I look at Somali youngsters here in the Netherlands, in comparison to the United Kingdom, I think they are doing fine. There they talk with knives and they have a real problem with gangs. (21-year-old man, with a Dutch passport)

Khat on Hollannissakin somalien ongelma:

s. 97: In January 2013 the government introduced a ban on khat, and decided to criminalise khat as a drug. The effects of using khat on Somali communities is high, as khat is often mentioned as one of the possible explanations for why young Somalis may get involved in crime. When families are destabilised, for example because of a parent's khat addiction, the risk is higher that young people will end up in the street. There are concerns that the drug can cause psychosis or trigger schizophrenia and is the main cause for many social as well as economic problems in Somali families.

Luku 11. The role of the media s. 108 - 113

Lehdistö keskittyy negatiivisiin juttuihin:

s. 110: A closer look at the news items shows that in particular the tone of the language used in the headlines is negative: only 1 of the 79 news items in this period could be considered positive, on the recognition of Somalia by the International Monetary Fund. Overall, stereotyping language and negative items dominate, causing negative representation. Examples of such headlines are "Vluchtkerk accommodation amounts to €160,000", "Who are these Dutch jihad youngsters precisely?" and "Rape concerns Somali refugee camps". Pejorative language and labels are also found in the text of the news items, such as the frequent use of the term "illegals".

Jälleen vähän erilainen raportti aikaisempiin verrattuna. Tulokset somalien osalta ovat käytännössä samat kuin Helsingissä, Oslossa ja Malmössa, mutta selitykset erilaisia. Tai oikeastaan tässä Amsterdamin raportissa yritetään aika vähän selittää, mistä somalien ongelmat johtuvat, todetaan vain tilanne. Suomen raportissahan kaikkiin asioihin oli syynä rasismi ja syrjintä.

Jos ajatellaan, että Suomen raportin näkemys rasismista ja syrjinnästä ongelmien selittäjänä pitää paikkansa, niin silloin samoille ongelmille kai voitaisiin Hollannissa ottaa selittäväksi tekijäksi rasismin ja syrjinnän. Mutta kun Umayya Abu-Hannan mukaan Hollannissa ei ole rasismia ja syrjintää. Olisi mielenkiintoista kuulla hänen näkemyksensä tästä raportista.

Tehdään kokeeksi samanlainen sanavertailu kuin Malmön raportissa:

discrimination
Helsinki 99 kpl
Oslo 60 kpl
Malmö 76 kpl
Amsterdam 29 kpl

Racism, racist ym.
Helsinki  75 kpl
Oslo 6 kpl
Malmö 20 kpl
Amsterdam 0 kpl

Segregation
Helsinki  27 kpl
Oslo 12 kpl
Malmö 17 kpl
Amsterdam 0 kpl

Mitähän näistä tuloksista voisi päätellä?
a) Hollannissa ei esiinny rasismia tai syrjintää
vai
b) Hollannissa ei huudeta heti rasismia selitykseksi?