2015-11-03 Saksa: Merkel ylirasittunut - kansleri syöksee Saksan kaaokseen

[Pentecost]

Hallitusohjelman mukaan ulkopolitiikkaa tehdään feminististen periaatteiden mukaisesti.

Mitähän se tälläinen ulkopolitiikka käytännössä on? Kuulostaa joltain järkyttävältä typeryydeltä verrattuna reaalipoliittisiin tosiasioihin.

[Totti]

Mielipuolisuus vain yltyy.

Kirjeenvaihtajalta: Feminististä ulkopolitiikkaa, kannabis kauppoihin ja äänestysiäksi 16 vuotta – peruskonservatiivinen Saksa on uuden edessä
Eurooppa- ja Venäjä-politiikassa Saksan linjaan ei ole tulossa suuria mullistuksia, kirjoittaa Eurooppa-kirjeenvaihtaja Suvi Turtiainen.

https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-12202757

Ruotsissa vaa'ankieliasemassa ollut mikropuolue vihreät sotki ihan kaiken kun olivat hallituksessa demarien kanssa. Saksan politiikka on hyvin samankaltainen jopa puolueiden värejä myöten.

On täysin selvä, että Saksan hallituspuolueet eivät tule ehjänä ulos tästä idiotismista. Sille käy samoin kun Ruotsissa, jossa hallituspuolueiden kannatus romahti pohjalukemiin ja vihreitä uhkaa lopullinen perikato.

Ehkä asiat nyt vaan ovat niin, että jokaisen länsimaan pitää kokeilla ultraliberalistista vihervasemmistolaista politiikkaa käytännössä ennen kun äänestäjät ymmärtämät mikä katastrofi se on. Persujen kaltaisten puolueiden varoitukset kaikuvat kuuroille korville ja todellisuuteen herätään vasta kun paska lentää omaan tuulettimeen.

Siivoustyö on kuitenkin massiivinen vihervasemmiston sekoilujen jälkeen. Ruotsi on käytännössä yhteiskunnallisen luhistumisen partaalla eikä Saksakaan ole edes tällä hetkellä kovin paljon paremmalla tolalla. Jos kaikki Saksan uuden hallituksen hankkeet toteutuvat, Saksalle voidaan suudella hyvästit toimivana yhteiskuntana.

[Jaska Pankkaaja]

Kylmää on kyyti Saksassa ja meidän kouhot painaa täysillä perässä 
Saksalaisiahan pidetään yleisesti erittäin rationaalisina ja koulutettuina ihmisinä noin globaalisti, monet uskovat niiden olevan jopa keskimääräistä älykäämpiä (en minä) ja siitä huolimatta politiikka on ollut huomattavan osan viimeisen reilun sadan vuoden aikana pelkkää itsensä päähän ampumista.

Saksassa on jo toteutettu monia "uudistuksia" jotka suomalaisia kalia-keioja vielä odottavat: pilapalkkatyöt ja omaisuuden konfiskointi kun ne omat vanhemmat joutuvat vanhainkotiin, noin pari esimerkkiä mainitakseni.

No mitäs pienistä vaihtorahoista kun tilalle saatiin sentään ihmisoikeuksia ja mukavia pelihetkiä jne.

[Skeptikko]

Busting the Merkel Myth – POLITICO
https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-busting-the-myth-german-chancellor-legacy/

Europe's celebrated 'leader of the free world' dealt with most problems by sweeping them under the rug.
...
Unlike other towering political figures of the recent past, be it Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher or even Barack Obama, Merkel can claim no signature achievement. The historic milestones of her era — German reunification and the deepening of the European Union — occurred long before she came to power. Even the economic renaissance Germany enjoyed during her tenure came as the result of reforms undertaken by her predecessor.

Even so, Merkel's legions of adherents ascribe all manner of monumental achievement to her, spanning human rights to climate policy. They portray her as a fearless crisis fighter whose steady hand navigated Germany and Europe around the shoals of the Lehman Brothers' collapse, the Greek debt implosion, the refugee crisis and the pandemic. The result is what might best be described as the Merkel Myth.
...
But did Merkel really "confront" global bullies? Did she transform Germany into Europe's moral leader? Is Berlin the world's new Ellis Island?

The less charitable view of Merkel is that she spent 16 years riding on the fumes of Germany's industrial might without tackling the deeper challenges the country faced either at home or abroad.
...
Claim: After Trump's election, Merkel, already seen by many as the world's most powerful woman, also became "the leader of the free world," keeping the candle of democracy burning.

Reality: It was left-leaning American and British newspaper columnists who bestowed Merkel with this moniker, one so far-fetched that she herself called it "grotesque and absurd." Though Merkel was clearly not a fan of Trump, she never lost sight of where Germany's bread was buttered. Just weeks after Trump's inauguration, she traveled to Washington, a large delegation in tow, to try to win over the American president and his family.
...
Bottom line: Merkel wasn't so much the leader of the free world as she was the mascot of a global establishment that identified her as its last great hope. Whatever power she had was of the soft variety.

Claim: Merkel kept Europe from falling apart.
...
Bottom line: It's a mixed picture. Merkel, hemmed in by her center-right party and that ur German phobia Europe would pick its pockets, managed to keep the euro from collapsing — but only just. At the same time, she did next to nothing to resolve the biggest threat to the euro: Economic imbalances between Germany and the rest of the currency area, which remain stubbornly high despite a recent pandemic-induced dent. While there should be no doubt about Merkel's commitment to European unity, her policies often had unintended consequences (see below).

Hommaforumilaisia kiinnostanee etenkin seuraava osuus migranttivyöryyn liittyen. Tämän Mukaan Merkel teki tässäkin katastrofaalisen virhearvion kuvittelemalla, että vain joitain satoja tuhansia migrantteja olisi tulossa, kun rajat avataan ja että nekin voitaisiin suurelta osin jaella muihin maihin taakanjaolla:

Claim: Merkel showed great compassion by admitting more than one million war refugees fleeing the Middle East.

Reality: Just weeks before the influx reached its peak, Merkel came under fire for bringing a 14-year-old Palestinian refugee girl to tears by telling her in a public forum that many asylum seekers would be deported because "politics is hard."

When Merkel made the decision to keep Germany's border open to refugees in late summer 2015, she did so based on two assumptions: that the total would number a few hundred thousand and she could cut a deal with other EU countries to share the burden.

She was wrong on both counts. What's more, Merkel's attempt to strong-arm other EU countries to accept a refugee quota backfired, fueling far-right parties across the bloc. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany, which that summer had dipped into the low single digits in the polls, won a new lease on life. Authoritarian populists including Hungary's Viktor Orbán and Poland's Law and Justice party used public fears of an EU-mandated migration scheme to tighten their hold on power. The division in the EU over refugee policy poisoned the atmosphere in the European Council, making progress on other fronts much more difficult.

In Germany, confidence in Merkel's course was undermined by the fact that those fleeing Syria's civil war only accounted for less than one-third of the asylum applications. In 2015, for example, the second-largest group of asylum seekers was from the Balkans.

Merkel responded to the political pressure by agreeing to significantly tighten Germany's asylum rules, making it much more difficult for refugees arriving in Germany to bring their families. Together with the EU, she also cut a deal with Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to seal off the migration routes in return for billions in cash, an arrangement that survives to this day. Turkey is now home to more than 3.6 million Syrian refugees. About 2 million more are stranded in Lebanon and Jordan.

Bottom line: Merkel's motives might have been pure, but her refugee policy was more successful in dividing Europe than in alleviating the humanitarian crisis.

Claim: Merkel was a champion for liberal ideals in the face of authoritarianism, standing up to strongmen from Putin to Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Reality: Merkel packed her foreign policy in gauzy rhetoric about human rights, but at street level, her approach over 16 years was guided by a simple maxim: Germany first.

On Russia, she's often lauded for supporting the sanctions the international community imposed over Moscow's invasion of Ukraine. In fact, she was a late convert, resisting intense pressure from the Obama administration. As concerned as Berlin was about Putin's intentions in Ukraine, Merkel also worried sanctions would have little effect on his behavior while costing German business billions in trade and further provoking Moscow.

Ja nyt saadaankin taas Merkelin tuhoisista päätöksistä taas makua, kun piti ajaa ydinvoima alas ja varoitteluista huolimatta uppiniskaisesti niiden sijaan rakentaa kaasuputket Venäjälle ja saada sodan todennäköisyys Ukrainaa kohtaan paljon todennäköisemmäksi ja samalla Saksa ja koko EU entistä pahemmin alttiiksi Venäjän painostukselle kaasuputken avulla.

Claim: Merkel is a feminist icon who pursued a progressive agenda, from social issues to the environment.
...
She had fewer women in her first cabinet than her predecessor, for example.
...
Her record is similarly mixed on other progressive priorities. During a Bundestag vote on gay marriage in 2017, for example, she allowed her Christian Democrats to "vote their conscience." She did the same — by voting against the measure.
...
Meanwhile, Merkel's decision in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan to switch off all nuclear power by 2022 has made the country more dependent on coal-fired electricity production than she had hoped. Climate analysts say that without further reforms (which the incoming coalition has promised) Germany has no chance of achieving its climate goals for 2030, much less carbon neutrality by 2045.

[Pallopääkissa]

Jatkuuko Saksa-ketju täällä sen jälkeen kun uusi hallitus on aloittanut?

Tänään oli Radio Patmoksella Ajankohtafoorumin aiheena Saksa kohti EU-liittovaltiota.

https://www.patmos.fi/patmosplus/?open-episode=294229&title=saksa-kohti-eu-liittovaltiota

Tuoreena ohjelmana se on kuunneltavissa ilman kirjautumista jonkin aikaa.

[Siili]

Tänään oli Radio Patmoksella Ajankohtafoorumin aiheena Saksa kohti EU-liittovaltiota.

Siinä vaiheessa, kun EU muuttuu liittovaltioksi, miten käy Saksan osavaltioiden (16 kpl)?  Ovatko nämä suoraan EU:n osavaltioita, vai ovatko ne osavaltion osavaltioita?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_German_states_by_population

[Pallopääkissa]

Tänään oli Radio Patmoksella Ajankohtafoorumin aiheena Saksa kohti EU-liittovaltiota.

Siinä vaiheessa, kun EU muuttuu liittovaltioksi, miten käy Saksan osavaltioiden (16 kpl)?  Ovatko nämä suoraan EU:n osavaltioita, vai ovatko ne osavaltion osavaltioita?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_German_states_by_population

Saksan sisällä olevien osavaltioiden itsehallinto vaikuttaa olevan suurempi kuin mitä tulevassa EU:n liittovaltiossa olisi sen jäsenmailla. Tai pikemminkin se liittovaltio olisi yhtenäisvaltio koska valta on tarkoitus keskittää Brysseliin. Ne jäsenmaat olisivat Brysselin kädenjatkeita, joita ei voisi kutsua edes osavaltioiksi, pikemminkin suoraan keskushallinnon alaisia provinsseja.

[-PPT-]

Nyt on valta vaihtunut! Scholz astui tänään virkaan  liittokanslerina. Merkelin 16v kausi on ohi.

[Pallopääkissa]

Pitäisikö otsikon nimeä muuttaa?

Merkele oli kanslerina 16 vuotta ja 16 päivää, kansleripäiviä kertyi 5861. Kaikkiaan ministeripäiviä on enemmän koska Merkele ehti 90-luvulla olla Helmut Kohlin hallituksissa nuorisoministeri ja sitten ympäristöministeri.

Saksan uudesta hallituksesta tulee mieleen Morgenthau-suunnitelma kun otetaan huomioon mitä vihreät haaveilevat ja vaativat.

[Golimar]

En ymmärrä mikä halvattu niitä saksalaisia riivaa kun ne aina keksivät mielipuolisia ideologioita kuten kommunismi, kansallissosialismi, vihertuholaisuus, monikulttuurisuus ja ties mitä muita hulluuksia jotka aina kalahtavat omaan nilkkaan.

https://vimeo.com/651741398

[Skeptikko]

Vastaan tuli vähän vanhempi juttu suuresta migranttivyörystä Saksaan liittyen National Geographicista. Juttu on mahdollisesti vuodelta 2016. Tässä joitain poimintoja siitä:

How the Latest Great Migration Is Reshaping Europe
With the worst history of xenophobia, Germany has taken in the most refugees of any European country. The stakes of the experiment are high.
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/graphics/europe-immigration-muslim-refugees-portraits

If you're European, and especially if you're German, you've been living for a year now through an unsettling public debate about what that identity means—and how people born elsewhere fit into it. In late August 2015, the tension over the influx of refugees from the Middle East had grown extreme. Seventy-one people were found dead, abandoned by traffickers, in a locked truck in Austria. Neo-Nazi hooligans attacked the police outside a shelter in Heidenau, near Dresden. When German chancellor Angela Merkel visited the shelter to show her support for the refugees, angry demonstrators greeted her with cries of "We are the people!" She was called a "whore," a "stupid slut," and a "Volksverräter"—a Nazi-era epithet meaning "betrayer of the people."
...
But only some European minds and fewer European hearts have adjusted to that reality. Even in the U.S., which John F. Kennedy called "a nation of immigrants," immigration is a divisive issue—and always has been. In the 1750s Benjamin Franklin worried that too many Germans were coming to Pennsylvania. He said they had a "swarthy complexion."

Germans have a word for what Franklin was afraid of: Überfremdung, or "overforeignization." It's the fear that home will become unrecognizable, because there are too many strangers in it, talking in strange languages and behaving in strange ways. Most of us, if we look into our hearts, can probably at least imagine the feeling. In Germany this past year it has been on fiery display. There have been large nighttime rallies and flaming rhetoric by right-wing orators in Dresden and Erfurt.

Jutussa myöhemmin kerrottavat seikat puhuvat sen puolesta, että pelko maan muuttumisesta ei ole tuulesta temmattu.

And yet: Quieter but no less vivid, against the backdrop of Germany's history, were the flutterings of the better angels. Three-quarters of a century ago Germans were dispatching trains full of Jews to concentration camps in the east; now, at the Munich train station, they were greeting trains carrying Muslim refugees with food, water, stuffed animals, and smiles. On one German podcast I began tuning in to last fall, I heard a journalist from Die Zeit tell her listeners it was all right to feel "drunk" with pleasure at that transformation. To which another journalist retorted: The hangover is coming.

"The European Union is in a very, very fragile state," Michael Roth, Germany's state minister for Europe, told me in April. "I hope people are aware of that." The surge of refugees, along with Germany's inability to persuade the rest of the continent to follow its open-armed lead, was a major reason for that fragility—and the whole world became aware of it on June 23, when the British voted in a national referendum to leave the EU. The refugees weren't directly at issue—Britain has scarcely admitted any—but polls showed that reducing immigration, from both inside and outside the EU, was the main motive for the "Brexit" vote.
...
Though refugees are assigned and transported to specific facilities—Hesse gets 7.35890 percent of them, according to a federal burden-sharing formula—the day before my tour, an Iraqi family of six had found its own way to the Rotenburg base. "Word has gotten around about where things are nice," Baader said.

Vaikka kyse on ilmeisesti siitä, että maan sisällä turvapaikanhakijat ovat hakeutuneet mieluisassa maineessa oleviin maijoituspaikkoihin, kuvannee se yleisemminkin sitä ilmiötä, että jos olot järjestetään mukaviksi muihin maihin verrattuba, niin tieto siitä leviää ja väki alkaa hakeutua juuri sinne.

The refugees have become a fixture on the streets of Rotenburg. You see them slogging uphill toward the army base, pushing strollers and old bicycles and carrying plastic bags. Besides room, board, donated clothing, and other in-kind benefits, they receive monthly allowances of up to 112 euros per adult and 63 euros per child.

Paljonkos Suomessa maksettiinkaan turvapaikanhakijoille kuukaudessa? Summa oli käsittääkseni suurempi niille, joille ei tarjottu ruokaa ja piempi niille, joille on tarjottu ruokaa.

In the Lower Saxon town of Duderstadt, I met a graphic artist and sometime DJ, Olaf Knauft, who last year took in two teenage Eritrean boys. One day, he explained, he happened to meet a woman from the local youth agency who told him about the great need for sponsors and homes for all the unaccompanied minors. Knauft is 51, and his own two children, whom he raised alone once they were teenagers, have left the nest. He was nervous about living with a foreigner—and about how it would look for a single man to take in a boy—but he decided to take a chance on an 18-year-old Eritrean named Desbele, a Coptic Christian.

The two got on well—so well that three weeks after Desbele arrived in May, he confided to Knauft that he had a 16-year-old brother, Yoisef, who was stuck in Libya. Desbele was in touch with the smugglers. It would take 2,500 euros to get Yoisef to Germany. Knauft gave Desbele the money. In July he and Desbele managed to find Yoisef along a highway outside Munich, where the smugglers had dumped him.

Now Knauft has two new teenagers. And though he sometimes has to fuss about turning out lights, washing dishes, and who's boss, he has no regrets. He calls Desbele and Yoisef "my children." A few days before I met him, it had emerged that Yoisef had a twin, in prison in Eritrea. Knauft had paid 1,500 euros to get him out of jail and into Sudan, where he was waiting to cross the Sahara. This was definitely the last brother, Knauft said.

Paikallinen hyysääjä siis omalla rahallaan käytännössä tuki ihmissalakuljetusta.

The early immigrants were ethnic Germans, some 12 million of them. Driven out of Eastern Europe at the end of the war, they arrived in a bombed-out and destitute country. German or not, they were often unwelcome. Erika Steinbach, a CDU representative in Germany's national parliament from Frankfurt, tells of fleeing what is now Poland with her mother and baby sister and arriving on a farm in Schleswig-Holstein. "The farmer said to my mother, when she needed milk for my sister, 'You all are worse than cockroaches,' " Steinbach said. "There was not a lot of warmth."
...
The guest-worker program was shut down in 1973, when the Arab oil embargo triggered a recession. But today there are nearly three million people of Turkish descent living in Germany. Only half are German citizens. Some have ascended to prominence—such as Cem Özdemir, co-leader of the Green Party. What struck me about the conversations I had with ordinary Turks, however, was the consistent note of ambivalence toward Germany.
...
"We came as workers, and as workers we're integrated, but not as neighbors and fellow citizens," said Ahmet Sözen, 44, who was born in Berlin. He can't fully integrate, he explained, into a society his father doesn't belong to. In Bebra, on the other hand, everybody knows one another, and Turks stage an annual cultural festival in the town square, Fatih Evren said; integration has worked. Still, although he was born and grew up in Germany and has many German friends, he expects to be buried in Turkey.

Kyllä se kyseenalaistaa integroitumisen asteen, jos Saksassa syntymisestä huolimattakin olettaa tulevansa haudatuksi Turkkiin.

Germany has learned from the experience with Turks and other immigrants. Over the past 16 years it has relaxed its citizenship laws. Until 2000 you generally had to have German blood—at least one German parent—to be a German citizen. Now if you've been a legal resident for eight years or were born to such a parent, you can become a citizen—and in some cases keep your other nationality too.
...
But many of the refugees aren't the trained labor the country needs—or even prepared to enter its famous apprenticeship programs. Estimates suggest that upwards of 15 percent are illiterate. Many of the others aren't educated to German standards.
...
Most immigrants at the Bad Hersfeld school, said director Dirk Beulshausen, "see it as a gift that they're allowed to learn. Many Germans see it as a duty, and duty is always bad." There's a limit, however, to what even a great willingness to work can achieve. One social worker there, Joanna Metz, guessed that nearly half the immigrants in the program might fail to earn a diploma. "The problem is they have an unbelievable amount to catch up," she said. "Basically they need 48-hour days."
...
A large majority of Germans accept immigration and Islam intellectually, said political scientist Naika Foroutan of the Berlin Institute for Integration and Migration Research—but emotionally, not so many. Foroutan's team surveyed 8,270 German residents in 2014, before the Paris or Brussels attacks or the surge in refugees. They found that nearly 40 percent believed you can't be German if you wear a head scarf. Forty percent would limit the construction of conspicuous mosques. More than 60 percent would ban circumcision, an essential ritual in both the Islamic and Jewish religions. Finally, some 40 percent believed that to be German you must speak German without an accent. (Gisela Grunwald's mother must have met one of those.)

Jutun lopussa alkaakin sitten ilmetä jo vähän sitä millaisilla tavoilla tämä massamaahanmuutto on Saksaa muuttamassa:

Even before the terrorist attacks, even before a bizarre series of incidents outside the Cologne train station on New Year's Eve, when immigrants, more than half from North Africa, harassed and molested hundreds of women, many Germans perceived Muslims as a threat. That feeling has fueled the resurgence of the political right. "I don't believe such a mass of people can be integrated," said Björn Höcke of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), the populist party that after elections in March is now in half of Germany's state legislatures. Höcke leads the delegation in the eastern state of Thuringia. Immigration, he thinks, has undermined the "community of trust" that once existed in Germany. The AfD, he has said a little menacingly, is "the last peaceful chance for our country."
...
What are they afraid of?

In a word: Parallelgesellschaften, or "parallel societies." "The parts of cities where you wouldn't know you were in Germany," as Höcke puts it. The term is a bogeyman even among moderate Germans. To an American, it may evoke a more benign image—of a Chinatown or a Little Italy or even one of the hundreds of Little Germanys that once existed in the U.S. Why can't Germans take in immigrants now, in the same spirit? I put the question to Erika Steinbach, who, in spite of being a former refugee herself, has been a controversial critic of Merkel's policy from the right flank of the CDU.

"I don't want that," she said simply. "We should preserve our identity." Steinbach limned the threat with anecdotes. Her secretary in Berlin had been groped at the train station by a man she "could tell" was a refugee. Her hairdresser's son in Frankfurt was one of only two native Germans in his elementary school class. A CDU staffer there said that gangs of immigrants walk down the main shopping street belching in people's faces. "My goodness," Steinbach said. "What is it all leading to?"
...
The hate was appalling, but I could understand the apprehension many Germans feel. Even Ahmad could. "Germans are right to be afraid for their country," he had told me. "Germany is used to security and order. People are afraid that will change." But the encounter with him and the others had affected me.
...
Foroutan, 44, whose mother is German and whose father is a refugee from Iran, puts her hope in education. "You can educate people to see integration as self-evident," she said—just as Germany has tried, with limited success, to stamp out anti-Semitism. Since World War II a generation of hardened anti-Semites has died, and new generations have grown up confronted by television and also in school, by teachers like Damm, with what the Nazis did. Foroutan's survey suggests a similar change is under way with respect to immigrants. Young Germans are much more likely to accept circumcision and mosques.

But the refugees have arrived in a country that's still groping for a new identity—"a new German 'we,' " President Joachim Gauck called it in a 2014 speech. That more inclusive "we," Foroutan said, is part of what it means for Germany to be modern: open to the world and to change. German conservatives, however, aren't the only ones resisting that vision; many Muslim immigrants aren't exactly open and modern either. Some 30 percent of them, according to a 2013 survey, are fundamentalists: They believe that Islam should return to its seventh-century roots and that its laws take precedence over secular ones. At the Mevlana Mosque in Kreuzberg I met a bearded young teacher, Serkan Özalpay, who spoke, as other Muslims did, of the hostility he gets from Germans. Sometimes, when he passes in his turban and ankle-length robe, they spit. Then Özalpay surprised me by talking like the AfD. "The refugees don't belong here," he said. "Muslims don't belong in this country." He tells his flock to go back to Turkey if they can, that it's just too hard to live by the Koran in Germany.

One precept that brings traditional Muslim men into conflict with Germans, whose constitution guarantees equal rights for women, is their rule against shaking hands with one. Another is their intolerance of homosexuals. In a studio in Neukölln, the day after I met Özalpay, I shook hands with a different kind of Muslim—a chain-smoking, vocally lesbian DJ named İpek İpekçioğlu. She grew up in the Berlin that he considers godless, and she loves it.
...
The old Germany, İpekçioğlu said, has a lot going for it—Goethe, for example—but it still "has a fundamental problem saying, I'll open my culture and allow it to change." Once not long ago she was doing her thing on a stage in Leipzig, spinning her Anatolian house music; the dance floor was packed. A guy came up to her and demanded she play "German" music. So she dialed up the ethnic even more.

She wanted him—and all of Germany—to get the message: "We're here. We're not going back. We're going to shape the city to fit our lives."
...
When he became a social worker in Bebra, he started working with immigrants all the time. Now he feels that if Bebra were to become 90 percent foreign, so what?

[Pentecost]

Kaikesta tulevasta päätellen koko Merkelin "aikaansaannokset" ja muu tulee menemään historian roskakoriin nopeammin kuin moni osaa ajatellakaan. Koko nainen oli pelkkä täystuho Euroopalle ja sen tulevaisuudelle.

Lisäksi Saksa on niin ripustautunut Venäjän energiaan, että on aivan turha odottaa sen saavan mitään merkittävää aikaiseksi Putinin toiminnalle. Alla erinomainen näkemys tulevasta. (loput linkistä)

The tragedy of Europe is that Germany is not standing up to Russia, and that the EU is not standing up to Germany. A Russian invasion will see many losers. I expect the EU, apart from Ukraine itself, to be one of the biggest.

When Russian invades, it will inadvertently expose Europe's internal divisions. I say inadvertently deliberately, because I don't think this is Vladimir Putin's primary objective. He is concerned that colour revolutions in Russia's periphery, as he calls them, might eventually encroach on Russian politics itself. It is absurd, of course, to argue that Nato might invade Russia. This is a Russian strawman. The threat to Russia is much more subtle, but no less real. There is not much the US can offer to alleviate Putin's paranoia. He wants a political buffer zone, with Ukraine and Belarus definitely in that zone.

What Russia always does, which the EU almost never does, is act according to its own definition of strategic interests. What defines strategy is the willingness to pay a shot-term cost in service of a longer-term objective. European, and German foreign policy in particular, is nonstrategic in the sense that it is focused on short-term gain. If you prioritise car exports, you leave yourself with fewer degrees of freedom to pursue other interests: human rights, climate change, supply security, technological leadership.

When Russia invades, Germany and other European countries might at one point run out of gas. That would depend on how energy enters into this conflict. Germany has left itself in this position because successive governments failed to develop a coherent energy policy. Three nuclear plants went offline at the beginning of 2022, as will the last three at the end of this year. With the Greens in government, I see no chance of a policy reversal. The new coalition has ambitious plans for investment in renewables, but the maths does not add up. The energy transition requires unprecedented investment in modern gas-fired power stations as an interim solution. That means Russian gas for the most part. The Greens might kick up a fuss over Nord Stream 2, but I don't think they will have the gumption to leave the government over a pipeline, and sacrifice their investment programme for renewable energy sources. The deal is done.

https://www.eurointelligence.com/column/when-russia-invades

[Skeptikko]

Merkelin hallinnon perintö, Saksan armeija ei kykene puolustamaan Saksaa:

Ex-Nato-General: Bundeswehr kann Deutschland nicht verteidigen
https://jungefreiheit.de/politik/deutschland/2022/ex-nato-general-bundeswehr-kann-deutschland-nicht-verteidigen/

Ex-NATO general: Bundeswehr cannot defend Germany

BERLIN. According to former NATO general Egon Ramms, the Bundeswehr is currently unable to defend Germany. To the relevant question in the ZDF "heute journal" on Thursday, Ramms replied: "No. Short, clear answer: No." He attributed this to the downsizing of the armed forces after the end of conscription, but also to the "lack of money".

The stockpiling of ammunition and spare parts has also been shut down. "We're improving that now. But we haven't even gotten to the point where the armed forces, especially the army, are equipped with the organic weapons that they actually should have."

The statements by the army inspector of the Bundeswehr, Lieutenant General Alfons Mais, according to which the Bundeswehr is currently "more or less blank", evaluated Ramms as an oath of disclosure and a call for help.

Heeresinspekteur fordert Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr
https://jungefreiheit.de/politik/deutschland/2022/heeresinspekteur-fordert-neuausrichtung-der-bundeswehr/

Army inspector calls for realignment of the Bundeswehr

BERLIN. Against the background of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the army inspector of the Bundeswehr, Lieutenant General Alfons Mais, has called for a strategy change in German defense policy. "In my 41st year of peacetime service, I would not have believed that I would have to experience another war. And the Bundeswehr, the army that I am allowed to lead, is more or less blank," he wrote on the Linkedin Internet platform on Thursday.
...
The defense policy spokesman for the AfD parliamentary group in the Bundestag, Rüdiger Lucassen, made a similar statement. War is now raging in Europe and the Russian leadership is responsible for it. "For us Germans, this is a hard impact on reality. As we have repeatedly demanded, Germany must now completely reorient its defense policy towards threats of this kind," he warned to JUNGE FREIHEIT.

[Skeptikko]

Merkelin hallinnon perintö, Saksan armeija ei kykene puolustamaan Saksaa:

Ex-Nato-General: Bundeswehr kann Deutschland nicht verteidigen
https://jungefreiheit.de/politik/deutschland/2022/ex-nato-general-bundeswehr-kann-deutschland-nicht-verteidigen/

Ilmeisesti tämä yhdessä Vanäjähn hyökkäyksen kanssa herätti kuitenkin Saksan tekämään linjamuutoksen ja satsaamaan vihdoin vähän enemmän puolustuskykyynsä:

Presidentti Niinistö: Saksan päätökset merkittävin käänne Venäjän hyökkäyksen jälkeen
https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000008649128.html

PRESIDENTTI Sauli Niinistön mukaan Ukrainan kriisissä merkittävin käänne Venäjän hyökkäyksen jälkeen on ollut Saksan viikonlopun päätökset. Saksa päätti viikonloppuna sekä puolustusbudjettinsa vahvistamisesta että aseviennin sallimisesta Ukrainaan.
...
"Onhan se aivan käsittämätön. Sinisilmäisyyden aika päättyy, aletaan ymmärtää, että maailmassa on pahaakin, ja sitä on vaikea hyvällä taltuttaa."

Saksa osoitti olevansa taas valmis johtajuuteen ja vastuuseen, mutta armeijaa ei uudisteta yhdessä yössä
https://www.hs.fi/mielipide/art-2000008647399.html

LISÄKSI Scholz ilmoitti, että Saksa lisää omia puolustusmenojaan peräti sadan miljardin euron erällä. Niin Saksa aikoo pitkän alisuoriutumisen jälkeen jopa ylittää Nato-maiden tavoitteen, jonka mukaan puolustukseen käytetään vähintään kaksi prosenttia bruttokansantuotteesta.

Samalla Saksan puolustusajattelun perusta muuttuu: maa aikoo kantaa vastuuta paitsi Naton puolustusvelvoitteesta myös omasta alueellisesta puolustuksestaan. Tähän asti Saksan sotilaalliset painopisteet ovat liittyneet kansainvälisiin operaatioihin.

Naton jäsenenä ja amerikkalaisjoukkoja isännöivänä maana Saksa ei ole esimerkiksi Suomen tavoin joutunut pohtimaan, miten selviäisi yksin koko maahan kohdistuvasta sotilaallisesta uhasta.

Nyt tämä muuttui. Scholzin mukaan nyt on katsottava Venäjän sotilaallista kyvykkyyttä ja varustettava oma kyvykkyys sen mukaisesti. Muutoksen toteutuminen eli armeijan uusi varustaminen vie kuitenkin vuosia.
...
Monet johtavat poliitikot ovat kuluneen viikon aikana puhuneet Saksan ulkopolitiikan historiallisesta epäonnistumisesta ja myöntäneet Saksan arvioineen Venäjän presidentin Vladimir Putinin väärin. Putin aloitti sodan, joka muutti nopeasti vanhat asetelmat. Se sai myös Saksan muuttumaan nopeasti.

Mutta sitten iskivät punavihreät, joilla tunnetusti on kytkökset DDR:ään, joskaan näillä ei ehkä ole tarpeeksi vaikutusvaltaa estämään tätä:

Erhöhung der Militärausgaben: Kein grünes Licht für 2 Prozent - taz.de
https://taz.de/Erhoehung-der-Militaerausgaben/!5837955/

However, when Scholz named specific sums in the next sentence - 100 billion euros for the new Bundeswehr pot and more than 2 percent of the gross domestic product annually for the military - irritation spread among the Greens. Shaking of the head, whispering, looking at the cell phone. The protocol now recorded "sustained applause from the SPD and FDP", even standing ovations in a few cases. But with the Greens? Only applause from individual MPs.

The Greens seemed clearly surprised at this moment - as if the figures had been agreed between the Chancellor and the Minister of Finance, but not with the Greens.
...
Kathrin Henneberger, Chairwoman for Development Policy, recalls a clause in the coalition agreement. "It says that development spending should increase in line with military spending. As we understand it, that will continue to apply," she says. However, government spokesman Steffen Hebestreit made it clear on Monday: This coupling does not apply to the special fund. The word "special" is crucial here.
...
The second reason for changing the Basic Law is to circumvent the debt brake. Because the state first has to borrow the 100 billion that Scholz wants to spend on the Bundeswehr. Actually, according to the Basic Law, the federal government is only allowed to take on a maximum of 0.35 percent of the economic output in new debts per year. That would currently be around 13 billion euros.

The debt brake for dealing with the corona pandemic is currently suspended. This year, the federal government wants to take out another 99.7 billion new loans. Lindner explained, however, that he wants to comply with the debt brake from 2023 as planned. Therefore, the entire 100 billion euros for the special pot should already be booked in the 2022 budget year, even if most of the money will only be spent in the following years. He discussed it with Chancellor Scholz.

Actually, the Basic Law only allows bypassing the debt brake in emergency situations. The desolate condition of the Bundeswehr is not an emergency, but a structural problem. In order to strengthen the Bundeswehr with 100 billion euros, the debt brake could not be exceeded. But it is still possible if the exception is expressly laid down in the Basic Law, as is now planned.
...
The Left faction has already stated that it will reject the constitutional amendment outright. "In view of the huge national and international challenges, it would be absolutely insane to set military armament as a constitutional goal," said Parliamentary Secretary Jan Korte. However: The 39 votes of the left in the Bundestag are not needed for the amendment to the Basic Law.

Rearmament in Germany: The chancellor's coup
https://taz.de/Aufruestung-in-Deutschland/!5838517/

Juso chairwoman Jessica Rosenthal sounds even more determined. She announced that she would not support Chancellor Scholz's plans to equip the Bundeswehr with a special fund of 100 billion euros. Germany needs a strong Bundeswehr. However, sinking further billions of euros into a "black hole" is useless, according to Rosenthal to the Süddeutsche Zeitung . The Basic Law is also not the place where military spending should be fixed for all time.
...
t can be heard from Scholz's environment that quick action was necessary after the Russian attack. The pro-Scholz social democrats argue that the chancellor wanted to send a double signal with the 100 billion euro program. In the direction of NATO, that Germany plays a reliable and active role, and in the direction of Russia, that Berlin is serious about the turning point.

Fear of rearmament instead of diplomacy

But that does not convince some SPD leftists. The argument of the lack of time is completely understandable in view of the federal government's swing in terms of arms deliveries and the sanctions at Swift. But with the long-term reorientation of German defense policy announced by Scholz, which even necessitates a change in the Basic Law, there was no shortage of time, according to the SPD-Left. Some social democrats fear that Scholz's turning point will throw the baby out with the bathwater and that armament will replace diplomacy in the future.

A lot is also still unclear: Will this disempower the Bundestag? Or does parliament still have an influence on the expenditure from the special fund via the budget committee? To what extent will the repayment of the 100 billion euros in special debt burden the federal budget? The latter in particular worries many in the SPD. Finance Minister Lindner had announced that he wanted to prioritize spending more. SPD MPs who support Scholz's coup on Sunday also have bad thoughts. If de facto social SPD favorite projects such as basic child security, student loans and citizen's allowance are terminated, the number of skeptics in the SPD parliamentary group will increase rapidly.

The Green Youth is also skeptical as to whether the long-term rearmament of the Bundeswehr is the right answer to the Russian war of aggression. The SPD parliamentary group met on Tuesday afternoon for a special session that was not over at the time of going to press.

[Skeptikko]

Germany agonises over Merkel's legacy: did she hand too much power to Putin?
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/05/germany-angela-merkel-power-to-vladimir-putin-russia

After the war in Ukraine led German chancellor Olaf Scholz to pivot dramatically last week on his country's postwar creeds of faith, attention is shifting to his predecessors, who took Germany down a strategic path towards Russia that became a dead end.
...
Since then, all eyes have been on Gerhard Schröder, the unrepentant ex-chancellor who in his final weeks in power shook hands with Vladimir Putin to ratify the Nord Stream pipeline underneath the Baltic Sea. Just weeks later, Schröder slipped effortlessly through the revolving door to become chairman of Nord Stream. The resultant increase in Germany's reliance on Russian energy, politicians in Berlin now concede, may have led Putin to believe Germany would be too hamstrung to support concerted economic sanctions.
...
Less clear is why Schröder's course of expanding economic ties with Russia was broadly continued by his successor, Angela Merkel, and whether she did so purely out of passivity or to her political advantage.
...
But since last week, voices have been growing louder in criticising her sidelining of the foreign policy and security experts who warned her against seeing Russia as a reliable partner in trade. "A sober assessment of the German government's misjudgments in its dealings with Russia over the last 16 years is now overdue," said CDU politician and former Bundeswehr officer Roderich Kiesewetter.

"To Nato's great surprise, France and Germany in 2008 blocked a Membership Action Plan for Georgia, warning that Russia would interpret it as an existential threat. But four months later, Russia invaded Georgia anyway. In 2014-2015, when the US wanted to arm Ukraine over Russia's annexation of Crimea, Merkel and [then French president François] Hollande opposed such a strategy, instead investing in diplomatic efforts," Kiesewetter told the Observer.
...
There are also fresh questions over Merkel's unwavering support for the Nord Stream project, whose first pipeline she ceremonially unveiled in 2011. "With Nord Stream, it is now apparent that Germany was simply tricked by the Russian side: this was always a political and not a commercial project," said Kiesewetter. "Germany never addressed the European and the security dimension of the project."
...
Yet in the summer of 2009, her home state crashed on to the national agenda: the Wadan Yards shipbuilding company in Schwerin and Rostock filed for insolvency. With national elections looming three months later, Merkel faced a humiliating loss of 2,700 jobs on her home turf.

Six weeks before the country went to the polls, Merkel's press office announced a breakthrough: "The rescue of the Wadan Yards is in sight". At a meeting in Sochi, Merkel and Russian president Dmitry Medvedev had brokered a deal whereby the shipyards would be bought by Vitaly Yusufov, saving half of the jobs at the company. Until then, the 29-year-old Yusufov had worked as head of the Moscow office of a certain Russian pipeline company: Nord Stream AG. His father, Igor, served as energy minister during Putin's first term and was at the time coordinating Russia's energy cooperations as a special envoy.
...
Even at the time, there had been rumours that the shipyards' insolvent previous owner, Russian investor Andrei Burlakov, had merely been a straw man for a Russian mafia money-laundering plot, an allegation also made by a Spanish state prosecutor investigating Russian criminals' activities in Spain.

Mielenkiintoisena yksityiskohtana mainitaan myös se, että vuonna 2011 salamurhaaja ampui tämän Burlakovin.

[DuPont]

Ajoiko Merkel ydinvoimasta luopumista? Auttoiko Saksan riippuvuutta Venäjän kaasusta? Hoitiko energiapolitiikkaa niinku järkevästi?
Ajoiko monikulttuuria ja suurta maahanmuuttoa muslimimaista. Onko vastuussa rikollisuudesta ja turkkilaisten/arabien rikosorganisaatioista?
Mikä tulee olemaan Merkelin historiallinen tuomio, kun seuraukset alkavat näkyä? En näe Merkelin olleen hyvä johtaja, koska hänen politiikkansa seuraukset ovat pahoja.

Samaa ajatusta kuin Suomessa Halosen kohdalla. Kiva sympaattinen täti.
Mutta paha voi pettää pukeutumisellaan...

[Skeptikko]

Saksa helisemässä Ukrainasta tulevien pakolaisten kanssa, koska punavihreät hallitus on käytännössä lakannut karkottamasta ketään sellaisiakaan, joilla ei ole mitään tarvetta turvapaikkaan ja nyt nämä täyttävät majoituspaikat, joita Ukrainasta tulevat pakolaiset kaipaisivat:

The refugees would not have found accommodation without private help
https://www.bz-berlin.de/berlin/kolumne/ohne-private-hilfe-waeren-die-fluechtlinge-nicht-untergekommen

The State Office for Refugees is completely overwhelmed with the care of the people from Ukraine. That's amazing, because this authority is very well equipped, both financially and in terms of staff, says Gunnar Schupelius.
...
It may have been incompetence on the part of the LAF. But it is also true that the infrastructure for refugees in Berlin is already at full capacity, if not overburdened.

The accommodations are fully booked because recognized asylum seekers who should actually move out cannot move out because they cannot find an apartment. Rejected asylum seekers who have to leave the country also stay there because the SPD, the Greens and the Left Party are practically no longer deporting anyone.

However, the new war is forcing us to make a decision: Do we want to continue to take in everyone from all countries who make it to Berlin, even if they are not politically persecuted or have fled a war? Or do we have to give preference to the women and children who are now coming from Ukraine?

More wars are possible, also in Europe. And then we need to be able to help again.

[Skeptikko]

Angela Merkel doesn't deserve a quiet retirement
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/04/08/angela-merkel-doesnt-deserve-quiet-retirement/

She was hailed as the world's most powerful woman, the de facto leader of Europe and, for a while, of the free world. For 16 years Angela Merkel's popularity in her native Germany never fell below 50 per cent. For those who put their faith in the EU, she could do no wrong.

Then, when Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, her reputation collapsed. Now her legacy lies in ruins. It is rather difficult to find a Western politician whose status has fallen off a cliff quite like Merkel's. Ukrainians blame her for appeasing Putin and leaving them at his mercy. They recall the 2008 Bucharest summit, when George W. Bush wanted to offer Ukraine Nato membership but the Germans and French vetoed it.

As the full horror of the Russian occupation emerged, Volodymyr Zelensky could not contain his wrath: "I invite Mrs Merkel and Mr Sarkozy to visit Bucha, to see what the policy of 14 years of concessions has led to. The Ukrainian president called on her and the former French president "to see with their own eyes the tortured Ukrainian men and women".
...
She refuses to apologise, then, for any of the policies that have led Germany and Europe to catastrophe.
...
Where Mrs Thatcher stood up to tyrants, Mrs Merkel sought to accommodate them, in the naive belief that prosperity would rid Russia and China of their authoritarian regimes.
...
The biggest of these traps was her decision to allow Germany to become ever more dependent on Russian energy.
...
Her short-termist, opportunistic exit from nuclear power compounded this.

Worst of all was Mrs Merkel's stubborn support for the deeply sinister Nordstream gas pipeline project, which flew in the face of Anglo-American warnings and desperate pleas from Ukraine. She turned a blind eye to the fact that Nordstream's chairman – her predecessor as Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder – was being bankrolled by Russian energy. Nordstream had all the hallmarks of political interference, but she insisted that it was purely commercial.
...
On her watch, in the words of the Bundeswehr's most senior general, they were "stripped bare". She allowed German firms to sell "dual use" military equipment to Russia, but banned arms exports to Ukraine.

[Hiiden hirvi]

^ Jo ennen Venäjän hyökkäystä Ukrainaan oli The Economist'issa kirjoitus Merkelin perinnöstä. Sitä luonnehdittiin mielestäni tuolloin osuvasti sanoilla: "Merkelin perintö on kuin jäljet lumessa". Eli että Frau Merkel ei oikeastaan saanut aikaan mitään pysyvää hyvää. Kunpa olisikin jäänyt tuohon.

Zelensky on aivan oikeassa osoittaessaan Merkelin ja Sarkozyn suuntaan; sieltä se sylttytehdas löytyy. Merkelin taustan tuntien ei tarvitse edes painaa foliohattua syvälle päähänsä kun mieleen hiipii ajatus kaikkien aikojen "myyrästä" Saksan liittokanslerina.

[Totti]

Angela Merkel doesn't deserve a quiet retirement
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/04/08/angela-merkel-doesnt-deserve-quiet-retirement/

She was hailed as the world's most powerful woman, the de facto leader of Europe and, for a while, of the free world. For 16 years Angela Merkel's popularity in her native Germany never fell below 50 per cent. For those who put their faith in the EU, she could do no wrong.

Merkel on hyvä esimerkki siitä miten vasemmistoliberaalien juhlimat poliitikot poikkeuksetta epäonnistuvat eli ovat käytännössä tuhoisia koko sille agendalle, jota he sanovat ajavansa: demokratiaa, rauhaa taloudellista menestystä. Samalla se on esimerkki siitä, miten vasemmistoliberaalinen politiikka aina epäonnistuu.

Eikä Merkel suinkaan ei ole ainoa poliittinen megafiasko. Lähiaikoina mm. Schröder ja valepresidentti Joke Bidenkin oli vasemmistoliberaalien juhlimia. Kaikki järkevää ja kestävää politiikkaa taas haukutaan pataluhaksi kuten vaikkapa Tacher, Reagan, Trump, Orban.

Vasemmistopolitiikka toimii kunnes tulee kriisi. Eletään velaksi, ollaan sotilaallisesti naiiveja, tuulivoimalla eteenpäin ja kumbajaa. Kun velkaraha loppuu tai naapuri alkaa kolistelemaan sapelia koko vasemmistoliberaalinen korttitalo romahtaa ja ollaan kusessa, kädet sidottuna selän takana ja pistooli otsassa tekemässä pikaratkaisuja.

[Keza]

^Noinhan se on. Muita mainitakseni, jo yli 30 v sitten HS:llä alkoi näkyä tuo piirre, ensimmäisenä kiinnitti huomiotani Ibrahim Böhme artikkeli, pian selvisi, että mies oli oikealta nimeltään Manfred Otto Böhme. Suuressa innossaan HS:n toimittaja hehkutti sivun ellei aukeaman jutussa häntä, etenkin Ibrahim etunimi tuntui innostavan toimittajaa ja hänet nostettiin Saksa tulevaksi johtajaksi. Hän ehti olla noin kuukauden DDR:n SPD:n, jonka yksi perustaja oli, puheenjohtajana kunnes paljastui, että hän oli toiminut yli 20 v Stasin soluttautuja-ilmiantajana. Siihen päättyi sen HS:n sankarin poliittinen ura.
Sitten muista Espanjan Rodríguez Zapateron, jota toimittaja hehkutti pikkuhousut märkänä suurena esikuvana ja taisi valitella, että miksei Suomessa ole tämän kaltaista poliitikkoa, että pääsisi hänenlaistaan äänestämään.
Sitten Kreikan Alexis Tsipras, ah miten ihana äärivasemmistolainen jos olisi uskonut HS:n toimittajaa, taas taisi kastua pikkuhousut hehkutusta kirjoittaessa.
Ja sitten brittien Jeremy Corbyn, taas intohimoinen ylistysartikkeli ja tunnustus, että olisi ihana päästä Corbynia äänestämään. Ikävä kyllä HS:n vakio UK:n kirjeenvaihtaja kirjoitti parin päivän päästä oman arvionsa, jonka mukaan Corbyn on niin vasemmalla, että karkottaa osan duunareista, joten tuskin hänellä on mahdollisuuksia pääministeriksi. Joskus ajattelen, että tämä vakkarikirjeenvaihtaja säilyy HS:n leivissä pääosin sen takia, että on vanhan liiton feministi, eikä HS oikein kehtaa savustaa femakkoa pois, sen verran täysjärkisiä monet hänen juttunsa ovat. Tietysti ajat muuttuvat, vanhan liiton femakoillahan on HS:n silmissä se yhä pahemmaksi käyvä painolasti, että heidän mielestään naisella ei voi olla siitintä.
Mutta tosiaan HS:n toimituksessa tuntuu olevan, että mitä äärivasemmistolaisempi uusi poliittinen johtaja on, sen parempi. Heillä tuntuu olevan käsitys, että jäsenyys nuorena kommunistisessa nuorisoliikkeessä on varmin merkki suuresta poliittisesta johtajasta, ainakin EU maissa.

[Econ101]

En tiedä parempaakaan paikkaa tälle.

Pohjois-Saksassa sijaitsevassa Schleswig-Holsteinin osavaltiossa järjestetään toukokuussa maapäivävaalit. Hommalaisia ei varmaankaan tämän pikkuosavaltion asiat paljoa hetkauta, mutta eräs detalji on näissä vaaleissa mielenkiintoinen. Äänestysikäraja vaaleissa on 16 vuotta.

Karkea jako liittovaltion sisällä on se, että mitä etelämmäksi mennään, sitä konsevatiisempaa on meininki. Pohjoisessa taas ollaan liberaaleja ihan ruotsalaistyyliin.

Siitähän tuo matala äänestysikäkin juontuu, jonkin sortin liberaalista haihattelusta. Ei Baijerissa tai Baden-Württembergissä 16-vuotiaat äänestä maapäivävaaleissa.

https://www.schleswig-holstein.de/DE/Landesregierung/Themen/Demokratie/Wahlen/Wahlen/Landtagswahl/documents/Lw_rechtsgrundlagen.html

[Skeptikko]

https://twitter.com/anders_aslund/status/1470505797582999565
[tweet]1470505797582999565[/tweet]

This is a big German scandal: Merkel blocked defensive arms deliveries to Ukraine through NATO for months.
It looks increasingly likely that she will join Schröder on some Russian state corporate board as so many other retired European politicians. They are so cheap.

https://twitter.com/JulianRoepcke/status/1470426812635402255
[tweet]1470426812635402255[/tweet]

Von wegen ,,volle Unterstützung"!

Merkel blockierte monatelang Waffenlieferungen von Nato-Staaten an die Ukraine

Obwohl die Ukraine die Systeme bereits bezahlt hatte und die Länder bereit waren, das Land mit Gewehren & Anti-Drohnen-Systemen zu versorgen.

https://www.bild.de/bild-plus/politik/ausland/politik-ausland/bild-recherche-merkel-blockierte-waffenlieferungen-an-die-ukraine-78529256,view=conversionToLogin.bild.html

Konekäännös:

"Täyden tuen" takia!

Merkel esti asetoimitukset Nato-maista Ukrainaan kuukausia

Vaikka Ukraina oli jo maksanut järjestelmät ja maat olivat valmiita toimittamaan maalle aseita ja drone-torjuntajärjestelmiä.

[Skeptikko]

Merkelin lisäksi muutkin ovat olleet rähmällään Merkelin tapaan Venäjän suuntaan:

https://twitter.com/eskelinen_antti/status/1561622733674397697
[tweet]1561622733674397697[/tweet]

So there is new Molotov -Ribbentrop deal between #Russia & #Germany.

Time for new #Nurnbergtrials2 for #Putin @OlafScholz . #Turpo #Säkpol #Ukraine #Nato

German @Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz said that before the war in #Ukraine began, he had promised #Putin that Ukraine would not become a #NATO member in the coming decades, Die Welt reports.

https://twitter.com/minna_alander/status/1561634385572597760
[tweet]1561634385572597760[/tweet]

Since there's still some disbelief about this outside of Germany: yes, an "environmental foundation" founded by Minister President of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Manuela Schwesig (SPD), received €192 million from Gazprom via their subsidiary NordStream 2 AG, in Feb-Nov 2021

https://twitter.com/minna_alander/status/1561635623366164481
[tweet]1561635623366164481[/tweet]

Instead of resigning over the mounting scandal, Schwesig was re-elected by 88,5% support as party leader of SPD Mecklenburg-Vorpommern on Saturday.

[Emo]

Miksi Saksa pettää odotukset?

https://www.hs.fi/mielipide/art-2000009124905.html

Saksan epäröinti  aseviennissä Ukrainaan ja vuosikymmenien aikana rakennettu riippuvuus venäläisestä kaasusta ovat toden totta loanneet käsitystä Saksasta tänä vuonna.

Saksan puolustusajattelun heikkous tai fossiilivetoisuus eivät olleet ennenkään mitään salaisuuksia, mutta nyt ne ovat hätkähdyttäneet.

Yksi syy heikkoon suoritukseen on heikko liittokansleri. Olaf Scholz sai vuosi sitten aikaan demarien vaalivoiton, koska vaikutti tasaiselta ja vakaalta – sellaiselta, johon Saksassa on totuttu. Sota-aika olisi kuitenkin kaivannut dynaamisempaa johtajaa.

"Yleinen myytti Saksasta on, että se olisi hyvin toimiva ja progressiivinen. Saksa on oikeasti konservatiivinen yhteiskunta, jossa asiat tapahtuvat hitaasti", sanoi pitkään Saksassa asunut, syksyllä Ulkopoliittiseen instituuttiin siirtynyt tutkija Minna Ålander haastattelussani elokuussa.

Tätä myyttiä vasten Saksaa usein arvioidaan. Saksalta odotetaan laatua ja johtajuutta, koska niitäkin se on tarjoillut viime vuosikymmeninä. Sitten pöyristytään, kun Saksa pettää odotukset.

SODAN riehuessa Euroopassa palautuu mieleen, mistä niin moni ongelma Saksassakin johtuu.

Kyvyttömyys ottaa sotilaallista johtajuutta Euroopassa juontaa pitkälti toisen maailmansodan sotasyyllisyydestä. Saksa on uskonut olevansa Euroopalle velkaa sen, että se pitää asevoimansa heikkona. Sama syyllisyys sekä siitä juontuvat sinisilmäisyys ja ideologisuus ovat ajaneet Saksaa myös liian luottavaiseen suhteeseen Venäjän kanssa.

Saksassa on 16 keskenään erilaista osavaltiota, joista viisi on väkiluvultaan Suomea suurempia. Osavaltiorakenne hidastaa ja vaikeuttaa toisinaan Saksan yhtenäistä toimintakykyä.

Osavaltiorakenteellakin on sotaan liittyvä syynsä. Sillä on haluttu välttää mahdollisuus, että yksi ihminen tai puolue ottaisi taas koko Saksan komentoonsa.

Saksa pääsi vasta 32 vuotta sitten eroon entisestä diktatuuristaan, DDR:stä. Sen jäljiltä kansa on edelleen jakautunutta ja osan luottamus valtioon on heikkoa.

HYVINÄ aikoina Saksan historialliset ongelmat eivät olleet halvaannuttavia. Silloin keskityttiin kasvuun ja hyvinvointiin ja uskottiin demokratian vahvistumiseen.

Nyt, huonoina aikoina, menneisyyden haamut ovat näyttäneet voimansa. Saksa on alkanut taistella niitä vastaan, mutta hitaasti se käy.

Lohdutonta on, että yhä uusia haamuja luodaan nyt siellä, missä ihmisiä ammutaan rikki ja lietsotaan vihaan toisiaan vastaan. Sodan jäljistä tulee taas väistämättä pitkät.

Kirjoittaja on HS:n Berliinin-kirjeenvaihtaja.

Erinomainen kirjoitus, vaikka ei tuossa luonnollisestikaan uskalleta täysin rehellisiä olla.
Esimerkiksi Angela Merkel oli DDR:ää, eikä hänestä päästy eroon kovinkaan kauan sitten.

Samaten liittovaltion huonous kannattaa muistaa, kun EU-liittovaltiota puuhataan.

Sosialidemokraattinen kommunismi pitää sotilaallista  heikkoutta hyveenä edelleen muuallakin kuin Saksassa, esimerkkinä kuka tahansa suomalainenkin demari ja mm. Suomen liittyminen Ottawan miinakieltosopimukseen.
Onhan se suvaitsevaisuuden peruspilareita, että rajat retkottaa  auki eikä miinoja ole eikä juuri muitakaan kunnon tappoaseita, ehkä jotain pientä "puolustautumiseen". Tietenkään ketään vastaan ei voida puolustautua, jos nyt vaikka itärajallemmekin marssisi satatuhatta miestä, niin kaikki haastatellaan yksilöllisesti koska joku voi olla "siirtolainen".

Oikein hyvä mielipide siis vaikkakin varovainen. Syylliset   (joista Merkel on huomattava vaikkei häntä haluttu mainita) eivät lymyä  jossain menneisyydessä; samat viherpunikit jatkavat vallassa edelleen. Ydinvoimaloita suljetaan vaikka energiasta on pulaa jne. Ideologinen hulluus rehottaa. Miinoja ei saada takaisin. Rajoja ei saada kiinni. Pakotteita ei saada voimaan.

[Ajattelija2008]

Merkelin lisäksi muutkin ovat olleet rähmällään Merkelin tapaan Venäjän suuntaan:
...

Instead of resigning over the mounting scandal, Schwesig was re-elected by 88,5% support as party leader of SPD Mecklenburg-Vorpommern on Saturday.

Kuten Suomessakin, Saksassa demarit ovat toimineet innokkaimpina Putinin kaasuputkikonsultteina. Demarivetoinen Mecklenburg-Etu-Pommerin osavaltio perusti "ilmastosäätiön", jonka todellinen tarkoitus oli kiertää Yhdysvaltain asettamat talouspakotteet Nord Stream 2 -kaasuputkea kohtaan. Venäjän omistama kaasuputkiyhtiö lahjoitti säätiölle 20 miljoonan euron alkupääoman.

Vielä jokin aika sitten Manuela Schwesig, 47, oli Saksan sosialidemokraattien suuri tulevaisuudenlupaus, jonka ennusteltiin nousevan eräänä päivänä jopa liittokansleriksi.

https://www.suomenuutiset.fi/saksan-demarit-perustivat-ilmastosaation-kiertaakseen-pakotteet-nord-stream-kaasuputkea-kohtaan/
Tämä on valaiseva artikkeli. Saksan SPD:n johtajiin kuuluva Manuela Schwesig rakensi "säätiön" kiertämään USA:n Nord Stream 2:lle asettamia pakotteita.

Kyseinen Schwesig nauttii näköjään edelleen puolueen täyttä luottamusta. Tämä vahvistaa käsitystäni, että Saksa on Venäjän liittolainen. Kaasuputkien räjäytys tämän perusteella oli USA:n työtä, jolla Venäjän liittolainen saadaan kuriin.

[Emo]

^ Siksi nyt kaikkialla Länsimaissa huudetaan raivon vallassa ryssää, ja siihen pienen Suomenkin presidentti ja pääministeri hienovaraisesti isompien mallin mukaan ihmisiä kannustavat, ettei tuon tapaiseen tutkivaan ajatteluun, tai ainakaan ajattelun tulosten julkaisuun olisi kellään uskallusta.
Tuon tyyppisen näkemyksen esittäjä on nykyään putinisti, Kremlin trolli, ryssän asialla, vaikka faktat (tuossa esitetty ja moni muu seikka sitä ennen) puhuvat sen puolesta, että ei ole välttämättä kovinkaan todennäköistä että NS-putket posautti Venäjä.

Ryssäviha on savuverho, jonka takana ei-ryssät pystyvät tekemään mitä mielivät. Syytökset lähtevät automaattisesti Venäjän suuntaan. Kätevää.

[Ajattelija2008]

Ryssäviha on savuverho, jonka takana ei-ryssät pystyvät tekemään mitä mielivät. Syytökset lähtevät automaattisesti Venäjän suuntaan. Kätevää.

Valemedialla on ongelma, kun Saksa on viides kolonna. Miten esittää uutiset niin, että Saksa näyttää olevan lännen liittolainen?

Saksan sisällä valemedia joutuu tekemään akrobaattitemppuja, että asema viidentenä kolonnana ei paljastu äänestäjille. Uusi Molotov-Ribbentrop-sopimus on nolo asia kertoa.

Joka tapauksessa Saksa hävisi tämän pelin, kuten se hävisi 1945. USA ja Venäjä ovat sotilasmahteja, joille ei Saksa voi mitään. Jos Saksa nostaisi metelin maakaasuputkien räjäytyksistä, niin vastaus olisi muotoa Spede shown "Ilmatilaloukkaus".

[Jorma M.]

Saksasta lisää:

https://www.kauppalehti.fi/uutiset/kl/4408a538-02a6-4939-9a9b-ae6915b4ebfb?ref=ampparit:e320

Saksan asiantuntijakomissio valmistelee apupakettia, jolla pyritään helpottamaan kotitalouksien ja yritysten tilannetta energiakriisin keskellä, uutisoi Financial Times.

Pakettiin sisältyy toimenpiteitä yritysten ja kotitalouksien auttamiseksi yli vuodeksi.

Komission ehdotuksen mukaan Saksan hallituksen tulisi maksaa kaikki kotitalouksien kaasulaskut joulukuussa sekä tukea asuin- ja teollisuuskaasun hintoja yli vuoden ajan ensi vuoden alusta lähtien.

Tämä on huomattava valtiontuki. Kaasu maksaa tällä hetkellä uusilta asiakkailta 28,3 senttiä kilowattituntia kohden, kun se vuosi sitten oli 6,8 senttiä per kilowattitunti.

Tämä 91 miljardin kokonaisuus sisältää 66 miljardia euroa yksityisten kotitalouksien ja pienyritysten kaasulaskujen tukemiseen ja 25 miljardia euroa teollisuuden tukiin.

Scholzin ilmoittama hätäpaketti on saanut osakseen arvostelua pienempien EU-maiden sisällä. Kriitikoiden mukaan ratkaisu heikentää euroalueen valmiutta torjua energiakriisiä yhteisvoimin.

Ja Suomen hallitus komppaa. Eikä auta omia kansalaisiaan.

[Pallopääkissa]

Kannattaisiko tämän ketjun nimi vaihtaa kun Merkele on mennyt eläkkeelle? Nimeksi vaikka "Yleinen Saksa-ketju" tai jotain sen tapaista.

Olaf Scholz on kiinalaisen rahan lumoissa. Se on huomattu myös USA:ssa.

Germany Doesn't Want To Give Up Chinese Money
https://youtu.be/7r2BVNNkyTo

While Europe writ large is waking up to the threat of the Chinese Communist Party, Germany seems to be moving in the other direction. At least its new Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, is. He's gone against members of Parliament, federal agencies, and European allies in maintaining close economic ties to China. In this episode of China Uncensored, we discuss a deal he pushed through allowing a Chinese shipping company to own a share of Germany's largest port, Angela Merkel's relationship with China when she was chancellor, and why Germany could be in trouble if it doesn't give up (or at least decrease dependence on) Chinese money.